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Abstract In this essay I investigate how image metaphors—metaphors that link 
one concrete object to another, such as “her spread hand was a star!sh”—promote 
visualization in the reader. Focusing on image metaphors in Imagist poetry, I assert 
that the two terms (e.g., the hand and the star!sh) of many of these metaphors are 
similar in shape and that this “structural correspondence” encourages the reader to 
visualize those metaphors. Readers may spontaneously form a “visual template,” a 
schematic middle ground that mediates between those similar shapes, in order to 
smoothly move between the two images within each metaphor. The structural cor-
respondence and the mediating visual template allow readers to mentally shift back 
and forth between the two images, yet readers cannot fuse the two terms through 
visual imagery. Research supports these claims: reader reports have demonstrated 
that subjects understand image metaphors primarily through their physical features, 
and work on the visual interpretation of ambiguous !gures suggests that though 
one cannot fuse images together, one may switch back and forth between multiple 
images of a !gure, especially if the images share the same frame of reference. These 
!ndings indicate that readers may be particularly likely to understand image meta-
phor through visual imagery, especially when the terms of the metaphor correspond 
physically. This essay is drawn from a larger project on the “poetics of literary visu-
alization”—a part-by-part investigation of the formal features of texts that elicit 
visual imagery. Such an account helps reveal the workings of the visual imagination 
and restore critical attention to this neglected aspect of the reading experience.
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The Fall and Rise of the Visual Imagination in  
Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism
As several champions of the visual imagination have pointed out, the visual 
image was practically banished from several powerful twentieth-century 
academic movements in psychology and literary criticism.1 At the begin-
ning of the century, however, the visual image was accorded quite high 
status, !guring prominently in experiments and criticism. The imageless 
thought debate (i.e., can one think without a mental image?) that swirled 
in the wake of Wilhelm Wundt’s 1879 imagery experiments at Leipzig 
spurred many psychological studies at the turn of the century (Roecke-
lein 2004: xii). In this environment, many literary critics (Downey 1912; 
Wheeler 1923; Valentine 1923) published accounts on the role of imagery 
in understanding literature.
 Yet toward the middle of the century, dominant voices in both disci-
plines spurned the visual imagination and disparaged its cognitive value 
for readers and thinkers. In psychology, the dominance of behaviorism, 
which rejected introspection as a valid measure of thought and replaced it 
with a more objective veri!able study of behavior, e&ectively minimized 
interest in visual images between 1920 and 1960. John B. Watson (1913: 
163) declared in 1913 that “the time has come when psychology must dis-
card all reference to consciousness”; to him, images were insubstantial and 
untrustworthy. Watson (1928: 76–77) later derided images as pleasant !c-
tions: “Touching, of course, but sheer bunk. We are merely dramatizing. 
The behaviorist !nds no proof of imagery in all this.” Allan Paivio (1971: 4) 
declares that “Watson’s stand on imagery . . . e&ectively suppressed inter-
est in the concept, particularly in America.” Jon E. Roeckelein (2004: xii) 
notes that with behaviorism, “the study of mental imagery largely waned 
and lapsed into disfavor among experimental psychologists, and became 
a ‘pariah’ that was not much studied in ‘respectable’ departments of psy-
chology.” The behaviorist rejection of imagery did not totally eliminate 
imagery research but rather pushed much of it underground. Though a 
few brave thinkers dared to consider mental images explicitly, most others 
did so only after they had renamed the images and thus concealed their 
visual nature—consider E. C. Tolman’s (1948) “cognitive maps” and C. E. 
Osgood’s (1953) “representational mediation” (Paivio 1971: 6).
 Similarly, in literary studies key critics and movements abandoned the 
visual imagination either through active rejection or sheer neglect. I. A. 
1. For the account of imagery within psychology, see Roeckelein 2004: xi–xii; Paivio 1971: 
4; Kosslyn et al. 2006: 5–6. For the case of literary criticism, see Esrock 1994: 1–6; Collins 
1991: 30–46.
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Richards, the legendary and proli!c critic, helps reveal the shift away from 
the visual image. In his 1925 Principles of Literary Criticism, he made several 
reasonable points about images—for example, “images which are di&er-
ent in their sensory qualities may have the same e&ects” (Richards 1985 
[1925]: 123)—and dryly noted that they have a “prominent place in the 
literature of criticism, to the neglect somewhat of other forms of imagery” 
(ibid.: 121). While not quite arguing here for the value of visual images, 
Richards at least acknowledged their prominence and sought to under-
stand them. But by 1929 his view of images had darkened. In Practical Criti-
cism he warned that “visualizers are exposed to a special danger” (Richards 
2001 [1929]: 45)—namely, that of (foolishly) using their own visual images 
as a basis for literary evaluation. To Richards (ibid.: 15), images are idio-
syncratic phenomena, associations that bear no logical relation to what 
the poet was imagining: “Images are erratic things; lively images aroused 
in one mind need have no similarity to the equally lively images stirred by 
the same line of poetry in another, and neither set need have anything to 
do with any images which may have existed in the poet’s mind.” In fact, he 
extends the separation between reader’s image and poet’s mind, broadly 
declaring that “images . . . are hardly ever a means which the poet uses” 
(ibid.: 132). Richards (ibid.: 124) quietly savages visual imagery, lodging 
it in his chapter “Irrelevant Associations and Stock Responses,” and even 
associates visual imagery with the meretricious and false lure of advertis-
ing: “Colours and pictures, the appeal to the mind’s eye, to the visualizer, 
are sources of attraction that able advertising agents have known and used 
for many years.”
 Other New Critics were even harsher (and closer to the behaviorists)2 
in their resistance to visual imagery. The New Critics focused on “the text 
itself ” and urged readers not to mistake their own experiences in reading 
(what the text does to an individual reader) for hermeneutical assessments 
(what the text is). In this regard, a visual image inspired by a poem was a 
trivial by-product of the poem, not an inherent and important feature of it. 
W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s (1954: 21) “a&ective fallacy” cate-
gorized interest in the reader’s felt experience of the poem (which of course 
includes visual imagery) as a logical error, “a confusion between the poem 
2. Collins (1991: 45) suggests that the two movements have signi!cant common ground 
“despite their mutual aversion.” He itemizes their shared interests: “Both struggled for 
American academic ascendancy in their respective disciplines . . . when Freudian metapsy-
chology was expanding its horizons. Both upheld the ideal of objectivity; both consigned 
imagery to the limbo of epiphenomena. Behaviorists built their system on the rubble of 
introspectionism; New Critics built theirs on the rubble of impressionism. Both engaged in 
objectively distanced explication of behavior: one, that of rats in a maze, the other, that of 
words on a page” (ibid.).
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and its results.” Further, they declared grave consequences for such confu-
sion; Wimsatt and Beardsley (ibid.) found that the attempt “to derive the 
standard of criticism from the psychological e&ects of the poem . . . ends 
in impressionism and relativism. The outcome . . . is that the poem itself, 
as an object of speci!cally critical judgment, tends to disappear.” René 
Wellek and Austin Warren (1956: 26) worked hard to insulate !gurative 
language from mental images; they claimed that “imagery” refers only to 
the former, and as for the latter, “much great literature does not evoke sen-
suous images.” William Empson (1962: 45) called imagery a “grand delu-
sion,” asserting that images have no cognitive function and contribute very 
little to understanding.
 The literary rejection of images extended beyond the New Critics as well. 
Close on the heels of the behaviorist valorization of language, the “linguis-
tic turn” in literary studies turned sharply away from the visual, encourag-
ing theorists to focus on structures of linguistic signi!cation within texts. 
Early structuralist critics looked to Saussurean linguistics as a model for 
their studies of textual signs; as Fredric Jameson (1972: vii) notes, the goal 
of structuralism was “to rethink everything through once again in terms 
of linguistics.” Though later critics adapted structuralist insights for many 
di&erent topics (e.g., cooking, clothing), structuralism began with Ferdi-
nand Saussure’s founding principle of linguistic di&erence;3 literary critics 
applied various di&erential and relational concepts from linguistics (e.g., 
phonemic and morphemic levels, syntagmatic and paradigmatic networks) 
to texts in an attempt to codify how readers understand them.4 Though 
their goal was important—to describe the “grammar” of literature that 
explains literary competence—their focus on meanings and forms most 
often excluded the visual imagination.5
 Later poststructuralist critics challenged many of the assumptions in the 
structuralist paradigm, including the belief that language manifests stable, 
3. As Norris (1991: 24) notes, “If there is a single theme which draws together the otherwise 
disparate !eld of ‘structuralist’ thought, it is the principle—!rst enounced by Saussure—
that language is a di!erential network of meaning.”
4. Culler’s seminal study Structuralist Poetics (1975) deserves mention here. See chap. 1 (ibid.: 
3–31) for a clear summary of the relational linguistic concepts at use in structuralism.
5. Culler reveals structuralism’s central focus on meaning in a key statement. In his response 
to Paul Ricoeur (who claimed that structuralism ignores phenomenology), Culler’s (1975: 27) 
language is telling: “The utterance itself, as a material object, o&ers no hold for analysis: 
one must be concerned with the speaker’s judgments about its meaning and grammaticality 
if one is to reconstruct the system of rules which make it grammatically well formed and 
enable it to have a meaning.” Culler attempts to prove structuralism’s phenomenological 
basis through its interest in meaning alone—this attempt suggests, strangely, a poetics of 
hermeneutics, or a poetic for hermeneutics, rather than a poetics for the reader’s full range 
of experiences with the text, including visual, a&ective, and interpretive.
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transparent meanings and the latent bias for spoken language over writ-
ten language; however, despite such challenges these critics maintained 
the notion that logical relations within language stand at the center of the 
textual universe. While Jacques Derrida (1977: 43), for one, critiqued the 
primacy of speech in Saussure’s linguistic theories as “logocentric,” he 
looked to written language as both the true power underlying logocen-
trism and the primary victim of its bias: “This logocentrism . . . has always 
placed in parenthesis, suspended, and suppressed for essential reasons, all 
free re+ection on the origin and status of writing.” In essence, Derrida put 
pressure on Saussure’s linguistic paradigm by investigating the relation-
ship between oral and written languages, not by looking beyond language. 
Further, in his project of “deconstructing” philosophical texts, Derrida set 
out to reveal (often by unpacking !gures of speech) how language frames 
and skews meanings. As Christopher Norris (1991: 19) puts it, “Above all, 
deconstruction works to undo the idea . . . that reason can somehow dis-
pense with language and arrive at a pure, self-authenticating truth or 
method.” However laudable the project of deconstruction may have been, 
its methods and interests were rooted in the logic of language meanings; 
thus notions of the visual imagination had little place within its language-
centered theoretical economy.
 In the 1960s, however, the cognitive turn in psychology and the rise of 
reader-response theory in literary studies helped thaw the mental imagery 
freeze. Slowly, and then with increasing speed, psychology studies brought 
the visual image back into circulation.6 As Roeckelein (2004: xii) notes, 
scienti!c interest in the topic of imagery made “a dramatic recovery with 
enormous increases from 1961 to the present.”7 Stephen Kosslyn, William 
Thompson, and Giorgio Ganis (2006: 5) note that this shift was sparked 
by changes in methodology: “Cognitive psychology o&ered a way to begin 
to assess properties of internal representations, which opened the door 
to studying mental imagery objectively.” Alan Richardson (1969), Paivio 
(1971), and P. W. Sheehan (1972) were among the !rst psychologists to 
6. While some key thinkers within the cognitive turn did investigate visual imagery, the 
movement has been criticized for its emphasis on meaning and interpretation to the exclu-
sion of other mental operations, such as a&ective and imagery responses. Meir Sternberg 
(2003: 355) has challenged cognitive science’s limitations (and its corollary limitations for 
approaching texts) on these grounds: “‘Cognitive study,’ has, indeed, typically suited its 
object to the name, thus restricting its scope . . . to issues of comprehension or memory, 
exclusive of feeling or value judgment. Reading or ‘processing’ a text amounts to under-
standing it, ‘mental representation’ to organizing the text’s meaning by and into a structure 
of ‘knowledge.’ So ‘cognitive’ might, or at times does, interchange with epistemic, semantic, 
conceptual, propositional, informational in the narrowest world-oriented sense.”
7. For an account of this shift as it was just getting started, see Holt 1960.
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closely investigate mental imagery after behaviorism. During this time, 
the modern imagery debate (the successor to the imageless thought debate 
of the late nineteenth century) began, and cognitive psychologists con-
ducted experiments to discover the format of mental representations; some 
argued that the brain represents information through a propositional code 
(i.e., an abstract verbal code) alone, and others countered that the brain 
makes use of both propositional and depictive (i.e., visual image–based) 
formats.8
 Paivio’s “dual coding theory,” which posits a nonverbal, mental image–
based mode of mental representation alongside a verbal one as an explana-
tion for the mnemonic superiority of concrete words over abstract words,9 
has attracted serious attention to mental imagery and visual imagery in 
particular. Though the “nonverbal” code accommodates mental imagery 
in general, Paivio’s early methods and discussion privileged the visual mode 
within mental imagery. Indeed, in Paivio’s (1971: 233) 1971 formulation the 
dual coding theory proposed the image and verbal codes after studying 
responses to “abstract words, concrete words, and pictures,” a framework 
that helps reveal the theory’s particular investment in visual imagery. 
Much of Paivio’s (ibid.: 207) discussion reveals a slippage between broad 
term image and the more speci!c visual image: “Thus concrete words 
not only are read or heard but some of them also evoke referent images; 
familiar pictures are perceived (images are aroused).” Perhaps because 
a few thinkers challenged the preeminence of visual imagery within his 
nonverbal system (Kintsch 1977; Flanagan 1984), Paivio (1986, 1991, 2007) 
moderates this visual investment in later versions of the theory, carefully 
noting the many modalities within the image system. Nonetheless, visual 
imagery remains a key feature within Paivio’s system.
 One strain of literary studies was mirroring cognitive psychology’s return 
to mental imagery in the late 1960s and 1970s. Reader-response critics 
moved attention from the textual artifact toward the reader, whose inter-
nal process of understanding the text, they argued, determined the text’s 
8. This debate between depictionalists and propositionalists (other names include pictorial-
ists and descriptionalists, respectively) continues today and now includes neuroscienti!c 
data. See Kosslyn et al. 2006 for the depictionalist case and Pylyshyn 2004 for the propo-
sitionalist case; Tye 1991 has an older survey. This debate, while certainly interesting and 
related to our topic here, does not directly bear on literary visualization—I am interested 
in the text-induced experience of visualization, not the fundamental cognitive format of that 
visual imagery.
9. Concrete language can be de!ned in various ways. Paivio mentions at least two main 
de!nitions for the concrete: language that directly refers to sense experience and language 
that refers to particular objects. We will mainly use the second de!nition, which is more 
clearly linked with visual experience.
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meaning. This mode of criticism directly opposed Wimsatt and Beards-
ley’s position, set forth in “The A&ective Fallacy” (1954 [1949]: 21–39), that 
the poem must not be confused with “its results.” As Jane Tompkins (1980: 
ix) notes, “Reader-response critics would argue that a poem cannot be 
understood apart from its results”; further, to these critics “meaning has no 
e&ective existence outside of its realization in the mind of a reader.” This 
interest in textual e&ects in the reader helped turn attention back to the 
visual image. Rather than experiences to be scorned or disregarded, visual 
images were reconsidered as signi!cant. Wolfgang Iser (1972: 287) values 
the creative powers of the reader’s visual imagination enough to lament 
authorial overdirection: “The author of the text may . . . exert plenty of 
in+uence on the reader’s imagination . . . but no author worth his salt will 
ever attempt to set the whole picture before his reader’s eyes.” Iser (ibid.: 
288) in fact focuses so much on the importance of the reader’s visual imagi-
nation that he feels it necessary to remind the reader that “the ‘picturing’ 
that is done by our imagination is only one of the activities through which 
we form the ‘gestalt’ of a literary text.” George Poulet (1980 [1972]: 42) 
notes that “the book is no longer a material reality. It has become a series 
of words, of images, of ideas which in their turn begin to exist.”10 Stanley 
Fish focuses most on the reader’s logical responses to the text’s grammar, 
but he does attend to the visual imagination as well.11 In “Literature in 
the Reader,” Fish (1970: 135) trims Walter Pater’s phrase “concurrence, 
renewed from moment to moment, of forces” to a sleeker “concurrence of 
forces” and declares that his version stimulates a more visual experience 
than Pater’s original: “The one [Fish’s redaction] allows and encourages 
the formation of a physical image which has a spatial reality; the mind 
imagines (pictures) separate and distinct forces converging . . . on a cen-
ter where they form a new . . . force; the other determinedly prevents 
that image from forming.” Reader-response critics attended to the reader’s 
multiple modes of interpretation, ushering in new interest in the reader’s 
visual images.
 More recently, several prominent literary studies of visual imagery 
have appeared, registering an even deeper interest in the reader’s visual 
imagination. Ellen J. Esrock’s 1994 study The Reader’s Eye surveys the long-
10. While Poulet does not specify visual images, they are contained within the broader set 
of images; his notion that the text exists in his “innermost self ” makes consciousness, with 
its visual imagery, the site of meaning.
11. The breadth of his method in “Literature in the Reader” (“an analysis of the develop-
ing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time”) 
suggests that Fish (1970: 126–27) will investigate a wide range of reader responses, including 
semantic, a&ective, and visual dimensions. However, Fish attends primarily to the ways 
grammatical patterns create particular semantic responses to the text.
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standing critical rejection of visualization and then outlines the literary 
applications for psychological insights about imagery. Esrock examines 
the relevant empirical data from cognitive linguistics and notes that visu-
alization exerts powerful, bene!cial e&ects on readers, such as improved 
memory and comprehension. Elaine Scarry’s 1999 work Dreaming by the 
Book is perhaps more literary in its focus than Esrock’s work. Scarry ana-
lyzes the ways authors direct the visual imaginations of their readers; with 
examples ranging from Homer to Proust, Scarry catalogs the mechanisms 
of “directed seeing.” She notes, for example, that authors often have readers 
superimpose hard-to-imagine visions on more easily imageable visions, 
such as a +ying spear on its moving shadow (the weightless shadow is easier 
to “move” mentally); this direction helps readers visualize the scene more 
easily. Together Dreaming by the Book and The Reader’s Eye suggest that after 
a long period of disavowal, literary critics are beginning to focus on the 
issue of visual imagery again.
 While these works have been foundational in rekindling interest in 
visual imagery, there is much still to be done. Most important, the study 
of literary visualization needs to take up a closer examination of how visu-
alization actually happens at the level of the word. Esrock examines a few 
attributes of “visual” language, but her project analyzes these attributes 
within texts quite brie+y.12 Scarry’s work does not identify verbal fea-
tures of texts13 but rather focuses on higher-order authorial procedures, 
extrapolated mainly from novels; Scarry assumes that readers visualize 
and focuses on how authors direct imaging through conceptual techniques 
(such as the moving shadow) rather than through the speci!c grammatical 
and lexical choices that help constitute those techniques. In crude terms, 
Esrock examines some features of language but without texts, and Scarry 
examines texts without investigating the features of language. What would 
extend the visual imagery research is more work that examines features of 
language within texts.14 This essay furthers this research by examining one 
feature or mechanism within a larger poetics of literary visualization.
12. Esrock’s volume brilliantly examines both the critical resistance to visualization and the 
cognitive research on visualization, but her study is not based in literary texts. In her conclu-
sion, Esrock brings in several textual examples, from Dante to Kafka to Marguerite Duras, 
to exemplify her claims about speci!c textual features in a literary analysis; she also inves-
tigates more abstractly the case of Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities. Overall, however, Esrock’s 
work is a foundational account of visualization’s place within literary criticism and a study 
of the consequences of visualization for readers, not an analysis of texts.
13. Features is a broad word, and I use it here to encompass a diverse array of language ele-
ments, including !gurative language (e.g., metaphor), grammatical patterns (e.g., hypotaxis 
and parataxis), and types of diction (concrete versus abstract language).
14. Interesting work has been done on this score by Collins, whose Poetics of the Mind’s Eye 
(1991) links cognitive psychology and a broad range of literary texts. This study sets forth 
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Critical Blindness to Imagism’s Visual Poetics
My investigation focuses on Imagist poetry, primarily because the Imagists 
worked hard to create a particularly visual poetry and secondarily to keep 
the study focused. Imagism, the Anglo-American movement of early 1910s 
London, led in turn by T. E. Hulme, Ezra Pound, and Amy Lowell, rejected 
the abstraction, sententiousness, and plodding meter that reigned in turn-
of-the-century poetry and lobbied instead for verbal economy, directness, 
and metrical +uidity. The Imagists produced four anthologies of work 
between 1914 and 1917. There are several good histories of the movement 
and its aims, so I will not give a detailed overview here.15 It is important 
to note that image itself, the root word for the entire movement, is a vexed 
term for both critics and Imagists alike: its exact meaning is rarely clear 
or consistent among Imagists, and it is not obviously visual.16 Despite this 
confusion about the image, in their many calls for literary revolution the 
Imagists presented a particularly visual poetics. Their theories of poetry, 
both in “o1cial” propaganda pieces and in related philosophical tracts, 
are shot through with references to sight and visual imagery. Crucially, the 
some provocative ideas about the ways language mediates visual imagery (e.g., prepositions 
may relate to saccades, or quick movements of the eye), but it spends far more time on 
higher-order cognitive phenomena (such as retrospection and introspection) than it does on 
speci!c textual features.
15. The most thorough account of Imagism’s history is in Harmer 1975: 17–44; this exhaus-
tive account corrects historical errors made by previous scholars, including Co&man (1951) 
and Pratt (1963). Less detailed but also strong is the version given in Jones 1972: 13–28; for a 
thumbnail sketch, see Gage 1981: 5–7.
16. Pound’s (1913a: 200) famous de!nition in “A Few Don’ts”—“that which presents an intel-
lectual and emotional complex in an instant of time”—is both confusing and nonvisual. 
Pound’s other, later de!nitions in “Vorticism” are confusing negations that do not explain 
what an image is, much less address the visual charge within the word image: the image is “the 
word beyond formulated language” (Pound 1970b [1914]: 88); “the furthest possible remove 
from rhetoric” (ibid.: 83); and “not an idea” (ibid.: 92). Pound (ibid.: 91–92) also de!ned the 
image as “an equation” between objects named in poetry (“sea, cli&s, night”) and poetic 
mood. Further, Pound (1973a [1915]: 374–75) notes that an image can be either “subjective,” 
arising within the mind, or “objective,” when “emotion seizing upon some external scene 
or action carries it in fact to the mind.” We do not know if the subjective form is a visual 
image, and we do not know what form the external scene takes when emotion (somehow) 
has carried it to the mind. Harmer (1975: 163–65) notes that Pound’s version of the image 
is more broadly psychological and less visual than Hulme’s. Adding to the confusion is 
the question of number: Imagists used the word to refer to both the single phrase (or visual 
image) or, following Henri Bergson, the combination of two dissimilar phrases or images, a 
combination that would yield an intuitive leap toward understanding (see Gage 1981: 9–13). 
This slipperiness suggests that the tantalizing silence about the image in some early Imagist 
propaganda pieces (e.g., Flint’s [1913: 199] gesture in “Imagisme” toward “a certain ‘Doc-
trine of the Image,’ which they had not committed to writing”) may have been expedient 
as well as commercially savvy. Indeed, Flint asserted in 1940 that “we had a doctrine of the 
image, which none of us knew anything about” (quoted in Harmer 1975: 168).
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Imagists take a strong interest in the reader’s visual images; the Imagists 
were by turns focused on making their readers form visual images and cer-
tain that their readers form them as a matter of course.
 Pound explicitly makes the reader’s visual experience a central (and per-
haps the central) feature of Imagism. For example, in “A Few Don’ts by 
an Imagiste,” Pound (1913a: 205) claims that what can be visually imag-
ined by readers will be the most durable aspect of a poem: “That part 
of your poetry which strikes upon the imaginative eye of the reader will 
lose nothing by translation into a foreign tongue” (note that Pound both 
assumes that the imaginative “eye” exists and implicitly calls on poets to 
write for it). The following year, in his essay “Vorticism,” Pound (1970b 
[1914]: 82) describes Imagism (vis-à-vis lyric poetry) as “another sort of 
poetry where painting or sculpture seems as if it were ‘just coming over 
into speech.’” Pound makes the reader’s visual imagination a key part of 
his poetics by 1918. Within Pound’s (1968 [1929]: 25) tripartite account of 
poetry, next to melopoeia, the musical property of poetry, and logopoeia, the 
conceptual association of its words, is phanopoeia: the “casting of images on 
the visual imagination.” Crucially, phanopoeia is related to Imagism—in 
his !rst adumbration of the three-part theory in 1918, Pound (1973b [1918]: 
424) does not use the term phanopoeia but instead lists imagism in its place 
between melopoeia and logopoeia: “imagism, or poetry wherein the feel-
ings of painting and sculpture are predominant.”17 Pound (1960 [1934]: 52) 
even uses the two words synonymously when looking back at Imagism in 
1934: “If you can’t think of imagism or phanopoeia as including the mov-
ing image, you will have to make a really needless division of !xed image 
and praxis, or action.” This interrelation of terms suggests that, to Pound 
at least, the practice of Imagism is very close to the practice of casting 
visual experiences onto the reader’s mind.
 Other Imagists only con!rm this devotion to visual imagery. Lowell 
places vision at the center of Imagist poetry by implicitly linking poem and 
picture. She wrote in 1917, “Imagists fear the blurred e&ect of a too con-
stant change of picture in the same poem” (Lowell 1921 [1917]: 246). Here 
the blurriness is obviously visual, almost photographic, as if Imagists court 
poetic ruin if they move their mental cameras when capturing a scene. 
Ironically, such an association of Imagist poem and picture prompted the 
editors of Some Imagist Poets (1916: v) to attempt to push beyond this simple 
17. Pound (1967: 102) uses the word phanopoeia earlier than 1918 when describing his early 
work on the Cantos in a 1917 letter to James Joyce: “I have begun an endless poem, of no 
known category. Phanopoeia or something or other, all about everything. . . . Will try to get 
some melody into it further on.” For some reason he decides to use imagism in 1918, but by 
1923 the term phanopoeia was !rmly in place.
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equation: “In the !rst place ‘Imagism’ does not mean merely the presen-
tation of pictures. ‘Imagism’ refers to the manner of presentation, not the 
subject.” Finally, there is Hulme. In his dogmatic, declarative way, Hulme 
is perhaps most emphatic about the importance of visual imagery in 
poetry, both for the reader and for the writer. Hulme’s literary philosophy 
centers on a sharp, visual language that communicates through images. 
He declares: “Each word must be an image seen . . . a man cannot write 
without seeing at the same time a visual signi!cation before his eyes. It is 
this image which precedes the writing and makes it !rm” (Hulme 1955c 
[1925]: 79). To Hulme, authors can only write through visual imagery, 
and readers must be able to see (presumably through visual imagery) each 
word that the author has written—a daunting requirement.18 Hulme (1955a 
[1908]: 73) even argues that the best poetry will make readers visualize so 
much that they become exhausted: “The new visual art . . . depends for 
its e&ect . . . on arresting the attention, so much so that the succession of 
images should exhaust one.” Certainly, other sensory modes, most notably 
touch,19 appear within Imagist theories of poetry, but overall their visual 
poetics is foundational.
 Despite these strong claims of visuality for both the writer and the reader 
in Imagist theories of poetry, many scholarly accounts of Imagist poetics 
seem uninterested in or even hostile to the visual aspect of those poetics. 
Scholarship on Imagism disagrees widely on a few contentious issues (e.g., 
who really created Imagism?), but the central accounts of Imagism seem to 
agree that the visual imagination is not a very important subject for schol-
arly attention.20 These accounts particularly devalue the reader’s visual 
imagery, minimizing its role within Imagist poetics and its contribution to 
poetic understanding.
 The early criticism largely repeats Imagist assertions for visual poetry 
18. Schneidau (1969: 44) remarks on the absolutism in Hulme’s statement: “Only an ideo-
logue could have written that. A practicing poet would have seen the obvious danger, that 
poetry made by that rule would very likely become picture-postcard verse.”
19. In his “Lecture on Modern Poetry,” Hulme (1955a [1908]: 75) claims: “This new verse 
resembles sculpture rather than music; it appeals to the eye rather than to the ear. It has to 
mold images, a kind of spiritual clay, into de!nite shapes.” Of course, even here the sculp-
tural model calls on the visual sense, as Hulme notes that the shaped clay will solicit the eye. 
Such mixing of touch and vision is also apparent in the guidelines laid out in the preface to 
the 1915 Some Imagist Poets anthology. One rule demands “poetry that is hard and clear, never 
blurred nor inde!nite” (Some Imagist Poets 1915: vii), in which a “hard” feel matches up with 
a “clear,” unblurred picture.
20. Harriet Zinnes, in Ezra Pound and the Visual Arts (1980), suggests a broader trend than 
visual imagery. Zinnes (ibid.: xvii) argues that Pound’s strong interests in the visual arts 
(painting and sculpture) have been understudied: “Until recently critics have almost ignored 
the signi!cance of this lifelong interest.”
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without examining exactly what such claims mean on the ground; such 
criticism generally ignores the visual imagination by not engaging very 
seriously with Imagist policy statements. Two of the earliest large-scale 
works on the movement, those by Glenn Hughes (1931) and Stanley Co&-
man (1951), are especially susceptible to this complacency; they both quote 
full-length Imagist policy statements with little explicit commentary. 
William Pratt (1963) notes that the image develops out of Hulme’s phi-
losophy of communication based on combined visual images21—a prom-
ising start—but then almost drops the notion of visual imagery, relying 
on an almost mystical de!nition: “It [the image] is a moment of revealed 
truth” (ibid.: 29)—but revealed where, and in what form? Pratt (ibid.) does 
note that the image should be “rendered . . . with the maximum of visual 
content,” but what exactly this visual content means or how it appears in 
the reading experience is not clear.22 In short, these early accounts do not 
seem very interested in grappling with the visual elements within Imagist 
theories.
 Herbert Schneidau’s (1969: 3–4) study Ezra Pound: The Image and the Real 
reads Imagism primarily as a movement for stylistic discipline according 
to Pound’s concept of a “living language” and claims that such discipline 
“remained at the heart of the achievement.” The visual currents within 
Imagism, in Schneidau’s (ibid.: 192) view, have been overemphasized, and 
he is explicit about his antivisual orientation: “In my discussion of Pound’s 
poetics I have been at some pains to subordinate the visual, since I had dis-
covered when I began that neither Imagist theory nor its practice were pre-
dominantly visualist.” Not surprisingly, the study stays true to this orienta-
tion: it focuses on the conceptual richness of the psychological account of 
the image; it emphasizes the artistic limits of a visual approach to poetry; 
and it dismisses the reader’s visual images as insu1cient registers of poetic 
depth (ibid.: 45).
 J. B. Harmer (1975) gives a detailed account of the changing status of 
“the image” for Hulme and Pound over the course of Imagism,23 but he 
21. Pratt (1963: 27) cites Hulme’s notion of synergistic visual images—“thought is prior to 
language and consists in the simultaneous presentation to the mind of two di&erent images” 
(Hulme 1955c [1925]: 84)—and declares, “Hulme maintained that real communication by 
human beings is made only by means of images.”
22. The closest Pratt (1963: 30) gets to addressing the reader’s visual experience of the 
poetry comes when he notes, “Imagist poems di&er from other poems in leaving more to 
the reader to interpret.” Yet this comment hints at visual imagery only to the extent that we 
think of images as products of interpretation.
23. Harmer (1975: 164–66) notes that the image was much more visual for Hulme and that 
Pound o&ered a more psychological account of the image, though one that took on some of 
Hulme’s visual basis by 1914.
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tends to neglect the reader’s visual imagery in his assessments of Hulme. 
Harmer emphasizes the writer’s role in perceiving and documenting visual 
images within Hulme’s account of the image and undervalues the reader’s 
role in receiving, creating, and experiencing them. As we have seen, Hulme 
is quite attentive to the reader’s experience of visual imagery, and Harmer 
even cites a few of these passages.24 Yet Harmer’s (ibid.: 165) assess-
ment addresses only the poet’s perceptual vision—Hulme “reduced” the 
image to “a percept”—and the poet’s faculty for translating percepts into 
poetry—“Hulme’s doctrine of the recording of visual images.” Harmer’s 
history seems at times exhaustive, yet even he neglects the ways Imagist 
theorists considered the reader’s visual experience.
 John T. Gage’s In the Arresting Eye (1981) challenges the coherence of 
Imagism by pitting its aggressive theoretical stances (e.g., the assertions of 
carefully transferred emotion and immediate understanding by the reader) 
against the reader’s experience with the poems. While Gage’s method 
implies an interest in the full range of the reader’s responses, he takes 
pains to demonstrate that visualization is not necessary for comprehension 
of the poetry. Arguing that metaphorical meaning does not hinge on visu-
alization,25 Gage (ibid.: 72) concludes that visualization does “not contrib-
ute to our understanding of the intended e&ect of the poem.” Further, he 
takes the sensible point about the necessary di&erence in visual imagery 
between poet and reader to an illogical extreme; the visual asymmetry, for 
Gage (ibid.: 74), renders the poem “no more than an arbitrary stimulus.” 
In other words, the reader’s necessarily idiosyncratic visual image compro-
mises not just the procedure of visualization but the poem itself.
 Daniel Ti&any’s Radio Corpse (1995) is not an account of Imagism per se 
but is especially relevant for our purposes anyway. The volume carefully 
traces the ghostly, the cadaverous, and the cryptic through Pound’s liter-
ary career, from antecedents in decadent literature to Pound’s embrace of 
fascism. Ti&any (ibid.: 21) places “Doctrine of the Image” at the center of 
such ghostliness and claims that this ghostly image resists visualization: 
“The modernist poetic Image is equivocally, but intentionally, nonvisual, 
24. For instance: “Nowadays, when one says a hill is ‘clothed’ with trees, the word suggests 
no physical comparison. To get the original visual e&ect one would have to say ‘ru&ed,’ or 
use some new metaphor” (Hulme 1955b [1909]: 10); and “the new visual art . . . depends for 
its e&ect not on a kind of half-sleep produced, but on arresting the attention, so much that 
the succession of visual images should exhaust one” (Hulme 1955a [1908]: 73); both quoted 
in Harmer 1975: 164. Both pay close attention to visual e&ects in the reader.
25. Gage (1981: 61) writes, “‘My love is like a red, red rose’ does not tell us anything about 
roses. It brings certain qualities of ‘my love,’ shared by red roses, into prominence. Although 
we are certainly able to visualize the roses, it is not on this ability, speci!cally, that the com-
parison depends. . . . Without visualization, then, comparison is possible.”
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insofar as it resists, contests, and mediates the experience of visuality, but 
also in its preoccupation with the invisible.” To make this claim, however, 
Ti&any engages far more with Imagist policy statements than with Imagist 
poetry.26 When the study does turn to poems, its readings often note that 
the poem is about ghostly material rather than creating a ghostly (i.e., non-
visual) reading experience.27 At times Ti&any seems not just to ignore the 
visual image but to snub it; in arguing that Pound’s vision for “In a Sta-
tion of the Metro” may have occurred behind closed eyes, Ti&any (ibid.: 
157) declares that “the visuality of the Imagist poem must therefore be 
described as highly ambiguous, if not dependent on a kind of blindness.” 
Certainly, Ti&any has little faith in the clarity and !delity of the visual 
image.
 Given the strong visual poetics of the Imagists and the paucity of critical 
attention to the visual e&ects of their poetry, Imagist poetry is a particularly 
fecund site for studies of literary visualization. In one respect, a study of 
literary visualization that focuses on Imagism investigates whether or not 
Imagist poetry lives up to its declared visual poetics—do Imagist poems 
encourage visual images in the reader’s mind?28 Do they solicit images for 
the “imaginative eye”? This present study asserts that they do and recruits 
the latest accounts in cognitive psychology and linguistics to explain how. 
In another sense, however, a poetics of visualization for Imagism attempts 
to make Imagist scholarship live up to Imagist poetics—that is, to address 
and repair a gap in criticism, the gap of the reader’s visual imagination. 
I hope that a poetics of visualization for Imagism will help bring visual 
imagery back into the fold of Imagist scholarship at the levels of both tex-
tual features and the reader’s experience. Further, an Imagism-based poet-
ics of visualization can extend beyond those narrow bounds, informing the 
study of literary visualization for a broader range of texts, including other 
poetry types and prose. At its broadest level of critical impact, the study 
26. Ti&any similarly privileges the poetics over the poetry when he takes critics to task for 
their willingness to treat the image in visual terms. He chastises critics for treating key !g-
ures within policy statements—not lines of poetry—as visual: “Critics rarely acknowledge 
that the most celebrated !gures of the Image (vortex, ideogram, Freudian complex, alge-
braic equation, and so on) are curiously resistant to conventional notions of visual experi-
ence” (Ti&any 1995: 23).
27. For example, Ti&any (1995: 58) quotes Pound’s poem “Sugit Fama”—“Kore is seen in 
the North / skirting the blue-grey sea / in gilded and russet mantle”—not to interrogate 
its visual or nonvisual status for the reader but to note that it refers to antiquity and the 
underworld.
28. This study acknowledges as a matter of course that not all readers will experience visual 
imagery, no matter what textual features are at work. Thus I use words like encourage, solicit, 
foster, induce and attend to the fact that, despite my arguments about image-inducing textual 
mechanisms, no text can ever guarantee visual imaging in its readers.
Gleason • Visual Experience of Image Metaphor 437
of visualization in Imagism helps balance literary critical approaches by 
focusing on poetics rather than hermeneutics; it may contribute to textual 
meanings, but its primary goal is not to privilege certain meanings over 
others but to understand how textual features or mechanisms help control 
the reader’s visual experience. As such, the study of visualization is part of 
a larger poetics that investigates how texts constrain and guide the reading 
experience.
The Present Focus: Image Metaphor
This essay will look at only one feature in this poetics: image metaphor. 
Image metaphor—a metaphor that connects one concrete object to another 
concrete object,29 as in the sentence “Her spread hand was a star!sh”—is 
a relatively new term and has not been theorized as much as metaphor 
as a whole. The term was coined by George Lako& (1987a: 219) and used 
by Lako& and Mark Turner (1989: 90–99), Lako& (1993: 229–31), and 
Raymond Gibbs (1994: 258–60), among others. Lako& and Turner (1989) 
argue that image metaphors are variations within the larger rule of meta-
phor. This larger rule is the conceptual theory of metaphor,30 an inter-
connected system of thought in which one concept (the source domain) 
helps govern how we think about another concept (the target domain); 
further, the theory notes that the source domain is usually more concrete 
and “grounded” than the target domain, which suggests an experiential 
mode of understanding abstract concepts. In this view, seemingly isolated 
phrases about love relationships, such as “Look at how far we’ve come,” 
“We’re at a crossroads,” and “This relationship is a dead-end street,” indi-
cate that the (more abstract) target concept of a relationship is understood 
through the (more concrete) source concept of a journey.31
 It is not clear exactly how image metaphors !t into this conceptual 
system. In Lako& and Turner’s (1989: 99) account, image metaphors are 
“one-shot metaphors, relating one rich image with one other rich image”; 
29. This de!nition is less inherently visual than Lako& ’s (1987a: 219) original de!nition: a 
“type of metaphor that maps conventional mental images onto other conventional images by 
virtue of their internal structure.” Lako& ’s de!nition assumes visualization, and in keeping 
with the notion that some people do not visualize, I have chosen to use an object-driven de!-
nition. Lako& ’s de!nition moreover strongly implies a shared (or at least similar) structure 
between terms, while mine does not. Thus my de!nition accommodates unusual, hard to 
visualize metaphors (such as “the pencil is fondue”), while Lako& ’s de!nition seems not to.
30. The original work here is Lako& and Johnson 1980: esp. 3–13, 46–60, and the theory is 
developed in Lako& 1993: 202–5, 208–12; Gibbs 1994: 161–67, 251–64; Lako& and Johnson 
1999: 31–44.
31. The examples are from Lako& and Johnson 1980: 44–45.
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in other words, they occur on their own, without a surrounding system 
of similar and conventional examples. Lako& (1987a: 221) also declares 
that image metaphors do not play a role in “grounding”—“they are not 
used to understand the abstract in terms of the concrete.” Adding to the 
uncertain footing for image metaphors within the conceptual theory of 
metaphor, their status as conceptual or nonconceptual is in dispute, or at 
least confusing: Lako& and Turner (1989: 90) note that image metaphors 
do not map concepts onto other concepts but “the structure of one domain 
onto the structure of another”; four years later, however, Lako& (1993: 229) 
argues that “the metaphor is conceptual; it is not in the words themselves, 
but in the mental images.”32
 One scholar who has examined image metaphors within Imagist poetry 
is Peter Crisp.33 In his article, however, Crisp is not concerned primarily 
with Imagism34 but with creating a theory that links image metaphors to 
conceptual ones. His study begins with an acknowledgment of image meta-
phor’s exceptional status: “If you are sceptical about the conceptual nature 
of metaphor you are likely to use image metaphor to buttress your scep-
ticism” (Crisp 1996: 79). Crisp uses the concept of the “image schema,” a 
mental !gure more abstract than an image but less abstract than a propo-
sition,35 to argue that image metaphors are not exceptions to the system 
of conceptual metaphor and quite the opposite: to him, image metaphors 
reveal the image schemata that undergird all metaphor. Crisp provides 
insights into controversies surrounding metaphor, but for all his discus-
sion on the exact nature of mental !gures, he does not really examine the 
reader’s experience of image metaphor. In fact, Crisp makes a key error 
32. The claim that image metaphors are conceptual is a di1cult one to make and seems 
limited to the extent that concepts can be de!ned by or understood through physical struc-
tures. Nonetheless, Lako& (1993: 231) and Crisp (1996: 88–90) both make this claim and use 
the image schema as a bridge between physical structures and mental concepts. Because it is 
a mediating !gure, however, the image schema can only be both structural and conceptual 
in quite abstract senses. Image metaphors are not conceptual in the way that the domains 
treated by the standard conceptual metaphor theory (e.g., a relationship and a journey) are 
each richly conceptual, with many parts and entailments.
33. Another scholar who examines !gurative language more broadly (metaphors, similes, 
analogies) in Imagism is Craig Hamilton (2004). Though Hamilton’s “cognitive rhetoric of 
Imagism” does not mention image metaphors by name, it addresses a few image metaphors 
through cognitive concepts, such as Lako& ’s conceptual metaphor theory (ibid.: 472–74, 
478–80) and image schema (ibid.: 480–82).
34. Crisp (1996: 79) notes, “I could, for the purposes of this article, have made a more or less 
random selection of image metaphors.” Imagism seems to be a merely expedient backdrop: 
“It seemed best to concentrate on a speci!c body of work explicitly centered on image meta-
phor. Imagism provides just such a body of work” (ibid.).
35. As Crisp (1996: 88) points out, the concept was created by Kant (1934 [1781]: 119) but 
developed by contemporary theorists. See Johnson 1987: 18–30; Lako& 1987b: 271–75, 440–
46, 1993: 214–16; Turner 1996: 16–25; Gibbs 2006: 90–96.
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about that experience—he argues that image metaphors can produce a 
fusion of disparate visual images.
 As my study will attempt to show, many of the image metaphors within 
Imagist poetry help foster a visual experience of the poem and a particular 
visual experience at that—one in which correspondent images shift back 
and forth in the imagination but never fuse together. The cognitive insights 
about image metaphor can help reveal how Imagist poetry is experienced 
within the reader’s mind and how this experience in turn shapes poetic 
meaning.
Image and Nonimage Metaphors in Imagist Poetry
But !rst, how common is image metaphor within Imagist poetry? One 
might expect that image metaphor would be quite common. After all, if 
Imagist poetry contains any metaphors at all, these metaphors should be 
image metaphors, according to the explicit anti-abstraction policy within 
Imagist theory. As Pound (1913a: 201) urges in a famous “don’t” in the 
seminal March 1913 issue of Poetry, “Go in fear of abstractions.” Yet meta-
phors of any kind may be challenged by the call for direct language. In 
the same March 1913 issue, F. S. Flint’s (1913: 199) !rst rule in “Imagisme,” 
his treatment of Imagist poetics, demands “direct treatment of the ‘thing’ 
whether subjective or objective.”36 Hulme’s poetic philosophy moreover 
owes deep debts to Henri Bergson, whose metaphysics stressed absolute 
perception over relative perception; by this account, one must strive to 
understand an object on its own terms, not through the mediation of other 
objects (Gage 1981: 9–11).
 These twin urges toward concrete language and direct representation 
of experience create a tension within Imagism, especially for its practices 
of image metaphor. On the one hand, the push toward concrete language 
suggests that image metaphors should dominate as !gurative language; the 
rejection of abstract language implies that !gurative comparisons should 
always link a concrete term with a concrete term. On the other hand, 
however, the notion of directness might imply a ban on comparisons in the 
!rst place—that is, is not the most direct treatment one that does not use a 
comparison with other objects as a method of registering experience? This 
36. Certainly, direct here also suggests impersonal or objective, as the Imagists sought to 
cut through the saturation of emotional commentary found in late Victorian poetry. But 
there is a stronger implication of direct—that is, the thing on its own terms—here as well. 
Pound (1973a [1915]: 375) does not clarify the issue when he writes, “By ‘direct treatment’, 
one means simply that having got the Image one refrains from hanging it with festoons.” 
“Festoons” might be a&ective comments, rhetorical +ourishes, or the alluring distractions of 
other, related subjects.
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tension suggests that Imagist poems might pull away from metaphor in 
general but specialize in image metaphor if metaphor is used.37
 Despite this tension, however, Imagist poetics did stress the value of 
metaphor and even leaned slightly toward image metaphor. Pound (1913a: 
203), though at times dismissive of metaphors—calling them “extrava-
gances” at one point (Hatlen 1995: 119)—uses metaphor to demonstrate 
poetic presentation, which he champions over mere description: “When 
Shakespeare talks of the ‘Dawn in russet mantle clad’ he presents some-
thing which the painter does not present. There is in this line of his noth-
ing that one can call description; he presents.”38 Hulme (1936 [ca. 1912]: 
134–35), in “Romanticism and Classicism,” claims: “Poetry is not a counter 
language, but a visual, concrete one. . . . It always endeavours to make you 
continuously see a physical thing. . . . Visual meanings can only be trans-
ferred by the new bowl of metaphor.” Not only does Hulme claim that 
metaphor is uniquely able to transfer visual references, he implies that the 
real mechanism is image metaphor. After all, Hulme’s concrete language 
works to showcase a “physical thing”—not an abstract concept (or, in his 
words, a near-mathematical “counter”). If a poem shows a physical object 
metaphorically, it makes the most sense for this object to be seen through 
another physical object, making an image metaphor. Concrete-abstract 
renderings are quite rare (e.g., “his hand was justice”) and, as mentioned, 
prohibited by the anti-abstraction rule.
 The Imagists did use metaphor in their poems, and much of it was image 
metaphor. Their poems are full of concrete-concrete comparisons.39 Exact 
numbers or proportions are hard to come by of course, but a good aver-
age seems to be in the area of one or two per poem. My survey of the 1915 
37. Hamilton notes a similar tension between the Imagists’ call for objective language and 
their use of !gurative language. He contends that the Imagists, sensing the importance of 
!gurative language for their own poems, tried to !nd “a balance between their use of !gu-
rative language in their own poems and their criticism of the !gurative language in others” 
(Hamilton 2004: 472).
38. Pound (1970b [1914]: 84) in fact repeats this suggestion that the poet surpasses the painter 
through poetic presentation, with Shakespeare’s metaphor again, in “Vorticism.”
39. Here, to maintain our focus on visual imagery, our de!nition of the concrete within 
image metaphor is based on objects, and at times image metaphors stretch the category of 
“objects.” The wind, for instance, does not seem to be an object, but the wind’s e&ects can be 
seen in other objects, as in D. H. Lawrence’s “Round Pond”: “WATER ru2ed and speckled 
by galloping wind / Which pu&s and spurts it into tiny pashing breaks” (Some Imagist Poets 
1915: 12). Here the wind’s e&ects compare to a pu1ng and galloping horse, and their visi-
bility through another material (water) makes the metaphor eligible for our purposes. The 
wind is not so visual in H.D.’s “The Garden”; the wind is compared to a concrete plow, but 
it remains a nonobject: “Cut the heat, / plough through it / turning it on either side / of your 
path” (ibid.: 23). Here the wind takes all of its object cues from the plow, providing none on 
its own; the metaphor thus does not count as an image metaphor.
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Imagist collection found !fty-four image metaphors in thirty-seven poems. 
(This accounting considers only the main titles as poems; the image meta-
phor ratio drops to !fty-four per !fty-eight poems if subheadings within 
poems—both numerical and titled—are counted.) As one might guess, 
these image metaphors are not spread evenly throughout the anthology: 
the ratio is highest in D. H. Lawrence’s poems (nineteen per seven or eight 
poems, depending on the counting method) and lowest for Flint (one per 
seven poems). Nonetheless, the overall numbers suggest that image meta-
phor is quite a common and signi!cant feature within Imagist poetry.
 Despite the prevalence of image metaphors in the Imagist canon, some 
metaphors produced by Imagists do not satisfy the concrete-concrete 
structure and thus are not image metaphors. Often an emotional compo-
nent takes one side of the structure, barring clear visuals; consider Richard 
Aldington’s “New Love”:
She has new leaves
After her dead +owers,
Like the little almond-tree
Which the frost hurt. (Some Imagist Poets 1915: 15)
Here new leaves apply not to some concrete, easily imaged thing but rather 
to the experience of !nding love after pain (explicit in the poem’s title). 
The leaves relate to an emotional state, and emotions, perhaps because 
felt but not visible, make for tricky cases of concrete reference.40 New love 
is hardly a tangible, concrete thing, but new leaves are tangible things: an 
abstract-concrete pattern. As another example, consider these lines from 
H.D.’s “Mid-day”: “A slight wind shakes the seed-pods. / My thoughts 
are spent / As the black seeds” (Some Imagist Poets 1916: 30). Here we have 
another abstract-concrete pattern; thoughts are presented in physical 
terms, as dispersed seeds. Aldington’s poem, H.D.’s lines, and many other 
examples like them reveal that Imagist practice did not always follow its 
anti-abstractionist policy, and thus metaphor in Imagism is less exclusively 
a mode of “image metaphor” than one might have expected.
 At other times, confused metaphorical reference may sabotage what 
might otherwise be a simple concrete-concrete rendering. For example, 
ambiguous pronouns are often tricky, suggesting either personi!cation 
40. In fact, Paivio (1971: 79) notes that emotion words challenge his data patterns for rated 
imageability (I): “Another group of words rated as abstract but relatively high I were a&ect 
labels and other terms implying sense experience other than visual-auditory, e.g., anger, 
happiness, etc.” (Abstraction normally correlates to low imageability.) Our insistence here 
on object-based visual sensory information would mean that emotions implying nonvisual 
experience would not count as concrete.
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or depersonalization. In “The River,” for example, Aldington begins the 
third stanza of the !rst section with an unintroduced pronoun:
She has come from beneath the trees,
Moving within the mist,
A +oating leaf. (Des Imagistes 1914: 16)
The reader has to relate “she” and the leaf, and the order of these words 
(“she” precedes “leaf ”) as well as our intraspecies bias (our tendency to 
read “she” as a female human) suggests a depersonalizing movement: a 
woman (or a girl) is presented as a leaf. By this reading, the woman moves 
with the +uid grace of a leaf in midair, though probably more slowly (the 
mist suggests slowness). Yet at the same time, another reading is possible, 
one in which the +oating leaf retrospectively de!nes the pronoun she: the 
leaf has been feminized; the leaf begins as “she,” though the reader does 
not know it at the outset. In this case the original pronoun momentarily 
suggests a person but then removes this notion, attaching instead to an 
impersonal object.
 Such ambiguity of pronominal reference may make the stanza di1-
cult to image. Depending on one’s reading, there are either two objects 
(woman/girl and leaf ) or one object (feminized leaf ) to visually image; cor-
respondingly, either the woman/leaf (a combination of the two objects) or 
the feminized leaf alone moves out “from beneath the trees” in the reader’s 
imagination. In the !rst reading we have an image metaphor (though a 
somewhat far-fetched one) because we have two concrete terms. These 
terms imply a correspondence of motion between the leaf and the woman. 
In the second reading we have only a conceptual (i.e., nonimagistic) meta-
phor: there are not two separate terms here but rather a leaf that bears a 
personalizing pronoun (“she”). In other words, we think of the leaf in some 
part as a woman, though we do not see the leaf in this way; the leaf still 
looks like a leaf, but it is charged with a female quality or a broader human 
import. At any rate, the fact of the two readings suggests that some image 
metaphors, especially those involving ambiguous nouns, may be slightly 
compromised by secondary, nonimagistic readings.
 Further, some Imagist poems have very little metaphor at all, image or 
otherwise; these poems seem to present a scene very literally. In Flint’s 
“Easter,” for instance, the speaker mentions the setting but does not develop 
it through !gurative language:
FRIEND
we will take the path that leads
down from the +agsta& by the pond
through the gorse thickets;
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see, the golden spikes have thrust their points through,
and last year’s bracken lies yellow-brown and trampled.
(Some Imagist Poets 1916: 51)
The speaker and the friend continue traveling through the landscape, watch-
ing it unfold before them, without using metaphor to focus or estrange the 
views. (There may be a metaphor in the notion of gorse thorns as “spikes,” 
but such a usage is almost totally conventional.) Such “straight” narrative 
may be responding to the slightly anti-metaphoric feel of both Hulme’s 
“absolute” perception and the directive toward the “direct treatment of 
the ‘thing’” (Flint 1913: 199). This impulse toward the literal, however, 
may pull the poet dangerously close to description, which Pound (1913a: 
203) warns against: “Don’t be descriptive; remember that the painter can 
describe a landscape much better than you can, and that he has to know 
a deal more about it.” Uneasily situated between these two directives—be 
direct but not descriptive—a subset of Imagist poems avoids conspicuous 
metaphor, image or otherwise, as the poems closely render a scene.
 Such counterexamples challenge the prevalence of image metaphor in 
Imagism and threaten to negate its relevance. After all, how can image 
metaphor be important or central to Imagism if there are many poems 
without metaphor at all or with another type of metaphor? Prototype 
theory (Rosch 1983; Lako& 1987b) suggests an answer; it is the theory of 
categorization based on prototype e&ects—features that the prototypes, or 
best examples, of a category are likely to manifest. In line with this theory, 
Crisp (1996: 82) convincingly argues that Imagist poetry can be catego-
rized through “simple family resemblance, a list of properties such that the 
more of them a poem has, the more Imagist it is.” To Crisp, image meta-
phor is one of these properties (or prototype e&ects) for Imagism.41 This 
theory holds that image metaphor does not have to be universal through-
out Imagism in order to be a de!ning feature of the poetry. Accordingly, 
one can note in good faith, as Crisp does, the centrality of image metaphor 
in Imagism (Imagism is “a speci!c body of work explicitly centered on the 
image metaphor” [ibid.: 79]) and also take pains to highlight its absence 
from many poems (“It is not perfectly exempli!ed even in Autumn. . . . 
H.D.’s Epigram (after the Greek) makes no crucial use of image metaphor 
at all” [ibid.: 82]). Prototype theory helps us reconcile the prevalence 
of image metaphor with counterexamples of many types and therefore 
maintain a more realistic conception of its importance within the oeuvre; 
through prototype theory we understand that deviations from (or absences 
41. Other properties Crisp (1996: 82) cites are brevity, free verse, concrete (and static) scenes, 
and impersonality.
444 Poetics Today 30:3
of ) image metaphor do not by themselves undermine the overall impor-
tance of image metaphor within the poetry.
Structural Correspondence
Image metaphor, when it appears, often plays upon similarity of shape—
what I call “structural correspondence,” following theorists of image meta-
phor;42 this congruence fosters a visual “reading” of the metaphor. The 
word often is chosen advisedly here: not all image metaphors are made of 
congruent terms. Indeed, the broad object-object linkage includes physi-
cally dissimilar terms, as in “the coiled rope is a maple leaf,” or “her spread 
hand is a banana,” or even the woman and leaf in the ambiguous stanza of 
Aldington’s “The River.” Yet when the terms of image metaphor are physi-
cally similar, as they often are, the image metaphor seems to encourage a 
correspondence in visual imagery.43 For instance, the physical correspon-
dence between the moon and a human face in Hulme’s “Autumn” helps 
organize the visual imagery that the poem produces. The poem’s central 
!gure, the simile (a close relation to metaphor) linking the moon and a 
face, directs attention to the similar look of a farmer’s face and the moon 
visible over a hedge:
A touch of cold in the Autumn night—
I walked abroad,
And saw the ruddy moon lean over a hedge
Like a red-faced farmer.
I did not stop to speak, but nodded,
And round about were the wistful stars
With white faces like town children. (Pound 1912: 60)
The similar shapes of the moon and the face are conventional and perhaps 
even culturally determined; indeed the phrase “the man in the moon” is a 
synecdoche for the more exact face we image onto the full moon. Despite 
the poem’s lack of speci!cation about what phase the moon is in, this con-
vention suggests that readers may be primed to link, imagistically, a full 
moon and a face. Further, the poem strengthens this correspondence with 
nearly synonymous color modi!ers—the “ruddy” moon and the “red-
faced” farmer—that prod the reader even more toward “seeing” the two 
42. Lako& (1987a: 220), in his original article on image metaphor, uses this terminology: 
“In mapping one image onto another, we make use of the internal structure of the images.” 
Gibbs (1994: 259) writes that “metaphoric image mappings work . . . by mapping the struc-
ture of one domain onto the structure of another.”
43. Note again the quali!cation. No amount of physical correspondence can guarantee 
visual imagery in the reader.
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items as visual cognates. (This poem matches colors again with the sec-
ond simile between the stars and the children’s faces: presumably town 
children—as opposed to farm children—are indoors more often, and 
thus their faces remain pale.) Finally, the speaker notes that he “saw” the 
moon—an explicitly visual cue; such a cue toward sight is strongly corre-
lated with visual imagery. The reader, prodded by the speaker’s declara-
tion of visual experience and grasping the implicit similarity of shape (a 
similarity a1rmed by the color cues), may be more inclined to register this 
correspondence through visual imagery.
 For another example, consider Lowell’s “Sunshine.” It is a short poem, 
but it manages to impress an inventive image metaphor upon the reader:
The pool is edged with the blade-like leaves of irises.
If I throw a stone into the placid water
It suddenly sti&ens
Into rings and rings
Of sharp gold wire. (Some Imagist Poets 1917: 80)
The poem presents the water rings created by the stone’s impact as solid 
wire rings, a metaphor that !xes the water, stops its implied motion, as 
if in a picture. Details about the rings of wire in fact support the idea of 
a picture: the wire is “sharp,” which implies not just a tactile sense but a 
visual crispness as well, which opposes the inherent blurriness of perceived 
motion. In other words, the clarity of the wire rings creates a sharp pic-
ture of those rings rather than a +uid expansion outward. In addition, the 
verb sti!ens supports the sharp rendering—the water is now more solid and 
motionless than its normal watery self.
 But what kind of picture (visual image) do we have, exactly? One might 
see one image of a pond with several (two? three?) concentric circles on 
the surface, equidistant from each other. The poem suggests this single 
image through the phrase “suddenly sti&ens”—“suddenly” implies a one-
shot immediacy, and “sti&ens” implies a hardness that cannot be changed. 
Alternately, one might image the metaphor as a sequence of frozen images: 
the narrative sequence of “rings and rings” (rather than just one mention 
of “rings”) implies multiple iterations of the concentric circles image, with 
more rings in the second image to correspond to the poetic restatement. 
And while the poem only speci!es one addition—“rings and rings”—the 
reader may follow the pattern and extend the sequence of images as part of 
a more lifelike continuation. (In this version, the water “suddenly sti&ens” 
multiple times, with each additional image.) Most likely, a larger gold ring 
appears on the outside of the subsequent image (or images) of the pond, 
pushing outward until they reach the edge or dissipate on their own, per-
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haps through image overload. The crucial imagery di&erence seems to be 
one’s reading of “rings and rings”: if one reads the phrase as a method of 
intensi!cation, one will probably see one image; if the phrase registers a 
narrative sequence, one will likely see multiple images.
 Unlike the !rst reading, the second version—the multiple image 
approach to the image metaphor—suggests that the water is in motion as 
readers image. Signi!cantly, the multiple images imply motion without 
demanding that readers image a +uid progression of waves; imaging the 
sequence of snapshots is a much simpler act of cognition than imaging 
the rings moving +uidly outward while simultaneously being generated in 
the center. As Scarry (1999: 100) argues, a series of discrete images implies 
motion without stating it directly; she names “addition and subtraction” 
as her third method by which authors get readers to imagine objects in 
motion. In her account, when objects are added or subtracted from other-
wise still images, the imager appreciates that the change involves motion. 
“Sunshine” indicates the limits of this illusion. The poem, at least in its 
multiple-image version, manifests the technique of addition (in “rings and 
rings”) for implying motion, but the visual experience of frozen images 
reminds us that the method only signi!es motion and does not actually 
represent +uid movement.
 “Sunshine” also helps indicate the extent of the reader’s role in generat-
ing structural correspondence. Certainly, the reader always performs acts 
of visual interpretation; even in “Autumn” the reader probably chooses to 
image a full moon (rather than a sickle moon) to correspond to the farmer’s 
face. But in “Sunshine” the reader’s role in structural development is even 
greater. The poem does not specify the arrangement of the rings, and thus 
a reader could imagine scattered separate rings on the poem’s surface. It 
is only most readers’ lived experience with stones and bodies of water that 
makes the image of concentric circles far more likely than the image of dis-
connected, decentered rings. The visual image of concentric circles re+ects 
the reader’s role in creating that speci!c type of physical correspondence, 
a topic we will return to later.
Research on the Comprehension of Image Metaphor
Readings of the poems above suggest that their image metaphors may be 
understood through visual imagery. Research supports the premise that 
readers use the visual imagination—not information alone—to under-
stand image metaphors. Gibbs and Jody Bogdonovich (1999) asked twenty 
college students to provide a line-by-line gloss of André Breton’s surrealist 
Gleason • Visual Experience of Image Metaphor 447
poem “Free Union,”44 a poem dominated by image metaphors. Here is the 
opening to that poem:
My wife whose hair is brush !re
Whose thoughts are summer lightning
Whose waist is an hourglass
Whose waist is the waist of an otter caught in the teeth of a tiger
Whose mouth is a bright cockade with the fragrance of a star of the 
!rst magnitude
Whose teeth leave prints like the tracks of white mice over 
snow (Breton 1984 [1931]: 183)
Gibbs and Bogdonovich hypothesized that participants would “map” (i.e., 
project) concrete images rather than “relational information” from source 
(e.g., brush !re) to target (e.g., hair) domains. That is, students would not 
use general knowledge of brush !res (including how brush !res start, dan-
gers associated with them, etc.) as much as their visual images of brush 
!res when faced with a metaphor that approaches hair in this way.
 Gibbs and Bogdonovich found that their predictions were justi!ed. They 
organized responses into seven di&erent categories and found that most 
responses (60 percent) fell into the category of physical transfer: “physical 
features of X [target] that are based on projection of the physical features of 
Y [source]” (Gibbs and Bogdonovich 1999: 41). In other words, the “look” 
of the source domain structures one’s reading of the target domain. For 
example, given the line “My wife whose eyelashes are strokes in the hand-
writing of a child,” one participant wrote, “Her eyelashes are thick, long 
as if they were single strokes of a child’s writing or painting” (ibid.: 40). 
The second largest category (28 percent) was “associations about X based 
on Y,” which were based primarily on the physical features of the source; 
for instance, given “whose waist is an hourglass,” one respondent wrote, 
“She has a Barbie doll !gure” (ibid.). Transfer of related information from 
source to target, as in “Her eyelashes are original, pure, and innocent” 
following the “handwriting” line, was quite rare (8 percent) (ibid.).
 The researchers then pressed the inquiry further by working to separate 
visual images from general knowledge. They asked twenty new participants 
to describe their visual images for individual target and source domains 
that were presented randomly; twenty others had to describe the “main 
characteristics” of those domains, again presented randomly. Given the 
44. Gibbs cites Lako& and Turner 1989: 89 for the poem. It was published in French in 1931; 
this translation is by David Antin and appears in The Random House Book of Twentieth-Century 
French Poetry (1984), edited by Paul Auster.
448 Poetics Today 30:3
phrase “nests of swallows” (the source domain in the line “Whose eyebrows 
are nests of swallows”), the imagers came up with what the nest was made 
of (twigs, straw, grass), where it was located (tree, rafter of old house), what 
it looks like (circular, delicate), what was inside the nest (birds waiting to 
be fed, eggs), and what the swallows were doing (chirping, singing) (ibid.: 
42). Those who described their knowledge of “nests of swallows” produced 
evaluative comments about birds (cute birds, unsanitary, alert), associa-
tions (birthplace, shelter, home, sanctuary, security), and some “image-
like features,” though usually vaguer than what the imagers produced.45 
Gibbs and Bogdonovich (ibid.) found that 58 percent of the mental images 
of the source domain corresponded to those readings from the !rst study, 
while only 21 percent of the knowledge of the source domain corresponded 
to those interpretations. Further, since 59 percent of the general knowl-
edge was identical to the correspondent imagery, Gibbs and Bogdonovich 
(ibid.) reasoned that really “only 12 percent of the non-imagistic, character-
istic knowledge that people have about source domain gets mapped during 
comprehension of image metaphors.” By their math, then, the interpreta-
tions from the !rst study were powered by visual imagery far more than 
nonimagistic knowledge—at almost !ve times the rate in fact (58 percent 
to 12 percent).
 These clarifying phases of the experiment suggest that people use their 
mental images of the source domain to a much greater extent than general 
or relational knowledge of the source domain to comprehend image meta-
phors. This study speaks to the power of mental imagery overall in the 
process of interpreting image metaphor. As Gibbs and Bogdonovich (ibid.: 
43) summarize, “It appears that understanding image metaphors depends 
on how people map their concrete mental images for aspects of the source 
domain better to structure target domains in these statements.”
 Gibbs and Bogdonovich’s !ndings are certainly useful in that they argue 
quantitatively for the centrality of visual imagery in the processing of 
image metaphors. But their research also helps reveal the limits of the 
concept of physical (“structural”) correspondence between metaphorical 
terms. Speci!cally, their notion of “mapping” or projection suggests that 
readers transfer the physical, imagistic qualities of the source to the tar-
get rather than !nding similar qualities in both domains. In other words, 
mapping basically suggests that physical correspondence is almost entirely 
created in the reading. This thought forces a reconsideration of the poems 
we have investigated: for “Autumn,” one might argue that the moon is only 
45. Gibbs and Bogdonovich (1999: 42) do not give examples of these “image-like features” 
but report that they “were not nearly as detailed and concrete” as those produced by the 
visual imagers.
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full because the face makes it so; for “Sunshine,” one could note that the 
water hardens into rings (rather than into slowly spreading undulations) 
only through the image of the gold wire. We are left wondering if the terms 
of image metaphor are ever correspondent on their own, or if rather one 
term (the source) always creates an appropriate physical agreement in the 
other term (the target).
The Visual Template
One poem that resists the notion of purely created correspondence is 
Pound’s famous “In a Station of the Metro.” This poem presents a rich 
symmetry of relations that imply a fundamental (i.e., not simply fabri-
cated) physical agreement. Most important, though, this poem’s rich sym-
metry strongly implies a mechanism of visual imagery—the “visual tem-
plate”—that allows readers to visualize the image metaphor easily. While 
this mechanism is most clearly evident with “Metro,” it in fact helps guide 
our understanding of all physically correspondent image metaphors.
 We should note !rst how the poem !rst appeared: the poem’s original 
spacing (upon initial publication in the April 1913 issue of Poetry [Pound 
1913b]) provides the loose picture of discrete units scattered against a 
background:46
The apparition  of these faces    in the crowd  :
Petals   on a wet, black   bough  .
Taken as a graphic image alone (i.e., as a visual perception of word group-
ings rather than as visual imagery prompted by the meanings of those 
words), this experience can take two forms: either the white spaces stand 
out between the disconnected groups of text, or the words in the text, clus-
tered into discrete units, pull apart from the white spaces between them. 
Either way, the spacing of the text brings attention to foregrounded units 
against a background.
 The two visual images inspired by the poem, one in each line, correspond 
well to this print-based picture—and also correspond to each other. Each 
line de!nes a separate !gure-ground relation, so there is an immediate 
structural similarity at play. Further, the !gures seem well matched: petals 
46. Lewis (1994: 200–204) provides a brief history of this poem’s spacing and punctuation 
changes over its publication history and suggests, while acknowledging Kenner (1971: 197, 
159) for the insight, that Pound’s return to conventional spacing in Personae and Gaudier-
Brzeska (1970a) may well have been his own choice, a desire to move away from a more static 
version of the poem. For an even more detailed account of the changes to the poem’s punc-
tuation and spacing throughout its publication history, see Ellis 1988.
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are more uni!ed and unde!ned than faces, but these faces lose de!nition 
through the situational descriptor “apparition”; the notion of “apparition” 
lends the faces a vagueness or gauziness that turns them toward petals. 
Finally, the two grounds (the crowd in the station and the bough) also 
correspond through connotation and visual image. Crowds are indistinct 
and jumbled, and a bough that is wet and black is most likely decaying 
and physically uneven—both look choppy and incoherent. In addition, as 
Hugh Kenner (1971: 184–85) has noted, the metro’s location underground 
(as well as the ghostly ring of “apparition”) points to Hades and the under-
world, which serves to strengthen the connection to the dark, decaying 
bough.
 In his famous birth story for the poem, Pound (1970b [1914]: 86–87) 
keeps the visual experience quite vague and open-ended; he describes 
the poetic “equation” that later came to him for this experience as “little 
splotches of color”:
Three years ago in Paris I got out of a “metro” train at La Concorde, and saw 
suddenly a beautiful face, and then another and another, and then a beautiful 
child’s face, and then another beautiful woman, and I tried all that day to !nd 
words for what this had meant to me, and I could not !nd any words that seemed 
to me worthy, or as lovely as that sudden emotion. And that evening, as I went 
home along the Rue Raynouard, I was still trying and I found, suddenly, the 
expression. I do not mean that I found words, but there came an equation . . . 
not in speech, but in little splotches of colour. It was just that—a “pattern,” or 
hardly a pattern, if by “pattern” you mean something with a “repeat” in it. But 
it was a word, the beginning, for me, of a language in colour.
Pound’s indeterminate equation, if visualized, works especially well for the 
poem because “little splotches of color” provides a schematic image for 
both lines—both the faces and the petals stand out against their mottled 
backgrounds, the crowd and the bough. The image of “little splotches of 
color” aligns the two visual images (i.e., faces against crowd; petals against 
bough), allowing the reader to shift between the two more detailed images 
quickly, enjoying a rich visualized comparison. Such an indeterminate 
mediating image is close to an “image schema,” the cognitive concept 
that has its roots in Kantian philosophy.47 Mark Johnson (1987: 18–30) and 
Lako& (1987b: 271–75, 440–46) adapted Kant’s notion of a !gure more 
47. Kant used the term “schema,” which was, for him, an imaginative procedure for cre-
ating images in alignment with concepts. In his famous example of the triangle, for instance, 
Kant (1934 [1781]: 119) emphasizes that the schema for triangle is a “rule” for synthesizing 
speci!c triangle images into a more abstract !gure: “The schema of the triangle can exist 
nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in 
regard to pure !gures in space.”
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abstract than speci!c images but less abstract than a concept to develop 
their theories of cognitive embodiment—that is, the ways abstract think-
ing and concepts are based in experiential, sensory perception. Johnson 
and Lako& both insist that image schemata grow out of bodily experience. 
In Johnson’s (2005: 16) recent de!nition, image schemata are “structures 
of sensory-motor experience . . . which can be used to understand abstract 
concepts and to perform abstract reasoning.”
 My notion of the “visual template” is similar to the image schema but 
di&erent in a few crucial respects. Like the image schema, the visual tem-
plate is schematic—more abstract and sketched out than a detailed image; 
otherwise, it would not support both of the images prompted by the two 
lines. But the visual template is less abstract than an image schema, as 
central examples of the image schema suggest.48 Johnson (1987: 126) and 
Lako& (1987b: 267) both enumerated classic image schemata, such as con-
tainer/containment, path or source-path-goal, blockage, attraction, link, 
and part-whole in their original lists. These image schemata are so abstract 
that they can accommodate a wide range of visual experiences: Lako& 
and Johnson (1999: 32) note that the “container” schema includes concrete 
objects, such as cups and rooms, as well as bounded areas, like basketball 
courts and football !elds. The container schema must be quite abstract 
to organize all these examples into one category. On the other hand, the 
visual template is only as abstract as is necessary to mediate between the 
two visual images of a particular image metaphor. In this sense, the tem-
plate serves as a greatest-common-factor image. The visual template does 
not need to accommodate a wide range of embodied experience but rather 
just the two images within each image metaphor; thus the visual template 
is metaphor speci!c. The template can be as detailed as the physical cor-
respondence between the two visual images allows.
 This di&erence in speci!city between the image schema and the visual 
template can be seen in Craig Hamilton’s cognitive analysis of “Metro.” 
Hamilton (2004) cites Johnson’s LINK image schema as the poem’s con-
trolling mechanism; to Johnson (1987: 118–19), this schema “makes pos-
sible our perception of similarity. Two or more objects are similar because 
48. While Grady (2005: 36–37) mentions in his recent review of de!nitions of the image 
schema that “there is a wide range of degrees of schematicity that researchers would accept 
into the category,” he suggests too that more speci!c versions of the de!nition violate the 
“original spirit of the notion” as expressed in Lako& 1987b and Johnson 1987. In particu-
lar, Grady (2005: 37) singles out Turner’s (1996: 167) claims that “a cup” and “two circles 
of the same size” count as examples of image schemata, noting that they are out of line 
with the prevailing trend among image schema researchers. Hampe (2005: 2) mentions that 
the central and abstract examples enumerated above are part of “the core of the standard 
inventory.”
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they share some feature or features.” This schema is obviously vague, and 
Johnson admits as much, but the larger problem is that it does not do 
justice to the visual imagery prompted by the poem. The image schema 
speci!es a link or links between objects (faces and petals), and Hamilton 
(2004: 481) extends himself as far as he can to express those links: “Two 
features shared by faces and petals . . . are (1.) their relatively small size 
in relation to the objects that (2.) they are linked to.” But the true power of 
the image metaphor in “Metro,” as noted above, is that it joins two !gure-
ground relationships, not just two objects. The LINK schema does not 
address the !gure-ground relationships; Hamilton’s analysis describes the 
fact of a connection (“they are linked to”) rather than the more particular 
!gure-against-ground connection.49 (The nonspeci!c link is broad enough 
to include petals touching the edges of the bough or even petals partially 
hidden behind the bough.) For clarity with the !gure-ground relation-
ships, Hamilton (ibid.) turns to Ronald Langacker’s notion of a “relational 
pro!le,” a joint concept for !gure-ground object relations and trajector-
landmark linguistic relations. The LINK image schema, it seems, is broad 
enough to capture some visual connections (e.g., size) between faces and 
petals in “Metro” but not the poem’s more complex relationships.
 The visual template, on the other hand, is metaphor speci!c and thus 
can capture as many elements (including patterns) as the two terms of the 
metaphor have in common. A greatest-common-factor accounting of the 
visual images in “Metro” certainly includes the !gure-ground relationships 
of faces against the crowd and petals against the bough, and it also can 
manifest more shared features, depending on one’s particular imagina-
tion. Though the poem does not specify the shape of the petals, one might 
imagine them to be oval, like faces. One might also imagine the crowded 
subway station and the bough not just as empty spaces but as dark, and 
perhaps visually mottled, backdrops. In short, the visual template’s speci-
!city to this poem, and one person’s reading of it, allows the reader to 
generate visual images through a personalized mechanism that is more 
detailed than an image schema.
 It is important to note here that this template does not unify the dispa-
49. Lest readers think that Hamilton (2004: 481) has merely used an infelicitous, vague 
phrasing (i.e., “linked to”) when describing the connection between the petals and the bough 
(or the faces and the crowd), another example proves him quite consistent in his wording: 
“Both faces and petals are smaller objects linked to objects (human bodies and tree boughs) 
that are larger in size, respectively.” Hamilton is quite clear that a clearer spatial connection 
is not speci!ed by the image metaphor. N.b., the verb link, while consistently vague here, 
recalls the name of the schema (LINK) and confusingly suggests that the image schema con-
nects items within each image (e.g., petals and bough) rather than similar features in both 
images (e.g., faces and petals).
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rate terms or images of an image metaphor. Rather, the template provides 
a common structure so that each image can be considered in turn; using 
the schematic visual of discrete shapes (ovals, perhaps) against a jumbled 
background allows the reader to switch between the two scenes quickly. 
The template is not a sheer combination of the two images; it is not a 
superposition of one image on top of the other. It operates instead as a 
sort of greatest-common-factor schema involving characteristics that are 
shared by both images.
Visual Images of Ambiguous Figures
Images such as the Louis Albert Necker cube (1832) or Joseph Jastrow’s 
duck-rabbit (1899) prove useful as analogies for this template. Drawings like 
these, known in psychology as “ambiguous !gures” or sometimes “classical 
bistable con!gurations,” are !gures that may be seen in two separate and 
incompatible ways: the Necker cube (!gure 1) has two di&erent top seg-
ments, depending on how one scans the image, and Jastrow’s duck-rabbit 
!gure (!gure 2) can be viewed as either a duck or a rabbit. What is impor-
tant here is that each !gure supports two distinct perceptions. The !gure 
allows viewers to shift between images, but signi!cantly viewers cannot see 
both images at the same time.
 Given the strong correlation between visual perception (i.e., sight) and 
visual imagery,50 the ambiguous !gures help mark the limits of the visual 
imagination. They reveal that the mind cannot “fuse” two images by seeing 
them at the same time, no matter how physically similar (or even equiva-
lent); the mind sees one and then the other. This failure to fuse multiple 
images of the ambiguous !gure is relevant for image metaphor: if one can-
not fuse two images that have exactly the same shape, how could one fuse 
two physically di&erent (though correspondent) images—the two terms of 
image metaphor? Our inability to see doubly implies an inability to image 
doubly. Of course, though imagery and perception may share fundamental 
cognitive processes, they are not equivalent, and many cognitive psycholo-
gists have attempted to !nd out exactly what ambiguous !gures can tell us 
about imagery processes.51
 Some research suggests that ambiguous !gures can shift during percep-
tion (so that the mind sees one image and then the other), but the !gures do 
50. See Kosslyn et al. 2006: 151–68 for a thorough survey, including counterevidence, of the 
cognitive connections between visual perception and visual imagery systems.
51. Researchers have used ambiguous !gures both to support and to challenge the notion 
that visual images can be ambiguous (i.e., interpreted as multiple di&erent images). For a 
good survey, see Kosslyn 1994: 336–39.
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not shift once imaged. Deborah Chambers and Daniel Reisberg (1985) dis-
covered that subjects who originally perceived just one version of Jastrow’s 
duck-rabbit !gure could not experience reversals of its form within visual 
imagery (an “image reversal”); the memory image remained !xed as either 
the duck or the rabbit. The researchers concluded that image reinterpre-
tation (i.e., a shift between the two visual images) is not possible because 
visual images are singular iterations: “According to our results, images are 
not ambiguous. None of our 35 subjects reported a single reversal on any 
of the test trials” (ibid.: 323). To explain this conclusion, Chambers and 
Reisberg hypothesized that images are inextricably linked to meanings: 
“An image’s referent is speci!ed by the imaginer” (ibid.: 325); “How a 
stimulus is internally described governs what prior !gures are evoked from 
memory” (ibid.: 327). In other words, an image is likely tied to an initial 
(semantic) interpretation of its form that prevents creative reimagining. 
On its surface, this research seems problematic for the possibility that the 
visual template allows the imager to shift between two related images. As 
we shall see, the case is more intricate than it may appear.
 Mary Peterson, John Kihlstrom, Patricia Rose, and Martha Glisky (1992) 
Figure 1 Necker cube
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assert, for example, that Chambers and Reisberg oversimpli!ed the case of 
ambiguous !gures.52 Peterson et al. (ibid.: 108) hold that reinterpretations 
of these !gures within visual imagery are of two kinds: “reconstruals” and 
“reference-frame realignments.” In the !rst, one only assigns a “new inter-
pretation” to image components; in the second, one mentally recon!g-
ures the “object-centered” directions, such as top/bottom and front/back 
(ibid.).53 In +at opposition to Chambers and Reisberg, Peterson et al. found 
that mental images of all types can be ambiguous, though some may be 
more susceptible to reversal than others. Signi!cantly, the researchers dis-
covered that subjects experience reconstruals of imagery more easily than 
reference-frame realignments: “These experiments indicate that the struc-
tural aspects of an image may be separated less easily from the reference 
frame in which they are speci!ed than from the interpretation assigned 
within that reference frame” (ibid.: 119). Peterson et al. show that the 
duck-rabbit !gure necessitates a di1cult reference-frame realignment in 
52. Kosslyn (1994: 336) makes a di&erent critique and claims that the ambiguous !gures used 
by Chambers and Reisberg may have been too complicated—“rather complex stimuli”—for 
subjects to hold and work with as visual images. Kosslyn argues that Chambers and Reis-
berg should have used simple stimuli to ensure that no cognitive capacity limitations a&ected 
the !ndings.
53. E. G. Boring’s (1930) wife/mother-in-law !gure involves only part-based reconstrual—
the wife’s jaw becomes the mother-in-law’s nose, but the global directions are in general 
preserved; the Necker cube demands only reference-frame realignment; the duck-rabbit 
!gure entails both types of reversals.
Figure 2 Duck-rabbit !gure
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addition to reconstrual; therefore Chambers and Reisberg’s claim against 
image reinterpretation in general ignores the relative ease of reconstrual 
alone within visual imagery. Overall, Peterson et al. demonstrate, contra 
Chambers and Reisberg, that visual images can be reversed, some more 
easily than others.
 Peterson et al.’s !nding that part-based reconstrual is easier than 
reference-frame realignment bodes well for the visual template. When 
working from the template, visualizers do not have to alter the global 
directions of the image; what they do more closely compares to a reinter-
pretation of parts than a reorientation of the object. This is because the 
two visual images prompted by image metaphors are likely to share global 
directions, and even when they might not seem to, the mind makes them 
Figure 3 Boring’s !gure (Boring 1930: 444). From American Journal of Psycholo". 
Copyright 1930 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Used with 
permission of the author and the University of Illinois Press
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share a similar reference frame. Consider part of Breton’s poem “Free 
Union” that Gibbs and Bogdonovich used in their study of image meta-
phor comprehension:
My wife whose hair is brush !re
Whose thoughts are summer lightning
Whose waist is an hourglass
Whose waist is the waist of an otter caught in the teeth of a tiger
The image metaphor “whose hair is brush !re” seems to suggest separate, 
even opposing, global directions between the visual images prompted by 
its terms: her hair probably falls down, while !res reach upward, and hair 
gets thinner and more tendril-like as it reaches its full length, while +ames 
get thinner as they reach upward.54 Nonetheless, as part of the mind’s 
desire to recognize patterns, the images become aligned. Either one rotates 
+ames downward to line the +ames up with downward-pointing hair, or 
one imagines the strands of her hair propped up a bit (on a pillow, perhaps) 
to align with !re’s standard upward trajectory.55 In other words, the mind 
makes the global directions align, and the visual template then mediates 
between the two aligned visual images. The real work for the visual tem-
plate at that point is to help the reader image the schematic tendrils as hair, 
then as +ames, then as hair again, an activity very close to a reinterpreta-
tion of parts. The visual template thus bears strong a1nities to Peterson 
et al.’s category of easily reversible ambiguous !gures, with the implication 
that one may shift back and forth between the two visual images.
 What is more, though the visual template matches up well with Peter-
son et al.’s distinction among reversals, it can still accommodate the broad 
(and seemingly mistaken) claim that visual images cannot be reversed at 
all. Though Chambers and Reisberg assert that visual images of ambigu-
ous and unambiguous !gures cannot be reversed, their !ndings do not 
account for the key di&erence between an ambiguous !gure and the visual 
template: articulation. That is, even if we ignore Peterson et al.’s chal-
lenge to Chambers and Reisberg, even if we assert, ignoring their !ndings, 
that visual imagery cannot be reinterpreted, the fact of articulation sepa-
rates the visual template from ambiguous !gures. The visual template is 
the structural intermediary between two richer images, and thus it points 
54. Certainly, other interpretations of this line are possible, and many of these do not neces-
sitate an alignment of object directions. The hair may be red like a !re or tangled and wild 
as a brush !re might look.
55. Such alignments are implicit between image metaphors whose terms seem aligned to 
begin with. The line “whose waist is an hourglass,” for instance, does not specify that the 
hourglass is standing up, but most readers probably imagine the hourglass this way so that 
it shares “global directions” with the torso of a standing woman.
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in two visually distinct directions. Crucially, in distinction to an ambigu-
ous !gure, the template demands an active !lling in of details for di&er-
ent visual images (the bough surely looks di&erent than the crowd, for 
instance), not a reinterpretation of a single memory image. The template 
model seems to combine the structural simplicity and singularity of one 
(basic) image with the distinct articulations of two di&erent images.
The Impossible Dream of Fusion
Despite the contention surrounding image reversals, the most important 
aspect of the analogy between the visual template and ambiguous !g-
ures—the impossibility of fusing multiple visual images—still stands. Like 
the ambiguous !gures, visual templates do not permit simultaneous views 
of di&erent images. Certainly, the mind can mingle parts of disconnected 
visual images and place petals against the crowd (or any other !gure-
ground cross-matching), but it cannot fuse the images so that faces and 
petals form a new image with all the features of both. This limitation pro-
ductively challenges the common critical assumption that Imagist meta-
phors unite their terms visually.
 Crisp, for example, makes several straightforward claims for fusion. 
Discussing Hulme’s “Autumn,” he writes, “The reader is led to see the 
moon distinctly and to see it simultaneously as a red-faced farmer” (Crisp 
1996: 85). On H.D.’s “Oread,” he argues that the “absence of any overt ref-
erences to waves helps the pine tree image to dominate and so fuse with the 
wave image” (ibid.: 86). These are not isolated examples for Crisp (ibid.); 
rather they re+ect the tendency for Imagist metaphors “to either dis-
tance or fuse their source and target domains.” Not all claims are so clear. 
Susan Stanford Friedman (1981: 56) argues that “Oread” “illustrates how 
the visual language of imagism parallels the mechanisms of the dream-
work as Freud described them.” The mechanism of the dream work that 
Friedman emphasizes is “condensation”; Friedman notes that this mecha-
nism allows the dreamer to synthesize “contraries” and “contradictions” 
(Freud’s terms) within “a single picture” (Friedman’s words). Regardless 
of the accuracy of Freud’s concepts of condensation, Friedman’s mode of 
applying this concept suggests too aggressively that the poem can achieve 
a nonrational union of visual images. Friedman (ibid.: 57) writes: “The 
poem signi!cantly does not rely upon similes, which by de!nition remind 
the reader that the images only make comparisons, not equivalences. The 
speaker does not say that a rough sea looks like pointed trees; she sees tree 
waves. Just as the dream-work gives the dreamer a visual representation of 
unconscious impulses, so the poem conjures an illustration of non-rational 
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reality.” Friedman may be right to emphasize one’s nonrational impres-
sion of dream images (i.e., tree waves, not treelike waves), but the poem is 
unable to fuse these two images for the conscious reader. Thus the poem 
only “conjures an illustration” of fused sea and land in the most concep-
tual, nonimagistic sense of “illustration.” The cognitive lesson of ambigu-
ous !gures is that the terms of image metaphor, no matter how conceptu-
ally related or physically similar, must remain distinct in visual imagery.
 Such critical confusion is not new of course. Remy de Gourmont, an 
intensely provisual writer and critic who proved quite in+uential for the 
Imagists, suggested that literature is superior to painting because literary 
works can combine visual images, while paintings cannot. His reasoning is 
complicated and deserves to be quoted at length:
Flaubert is not being literal when he writes: “The elephants . . . the spurs on 
their chests like the prows of ships cut through the cohorts; they rolled back in 
great waves.” He is able to amalgamate the two images (elephants and cohorts, 
ships and waves) so well only because he has seen them simultaneously. What 
he gives us is not two designs !tting symmetrically one over the other, but the 
confusion—visually absurd and artistically admirable—of a double and cloudy 
sensation. Try to represent the image of elephant-prows, of cohort-waves, 
visually! You would need a stormy sea which was a real sea and yet one not 
made of waves, but of soldiers’ chests and heads; and elephants who, whilst 
still remaining elephants, would also be ships. . . . Images can only be trans-
lated into painting—a literal, and indeed geometric, art—when they are not 
metaphors. (translated in Furbank 1970: 36)56
Certainly, de Gourmont is not entirely clear about his meaning here: the 
notion that Flaubert’s “two designs” are “visually absurd” suggests that he 
might disavow the fusion of two visual images (i.e., the sea and the soldiers; 
the elephants and the ships). But his declaration that Gustave Flaubert 
has “seen” two distinct images (e.g., elephants and ships) “simultaneously” 
seems to be an unmistakable claim for fused visual images, and in this 
light, his other remarks about the visual (i.e., “visually absurd”; “try to rep-
resent the image of elephant-prows . . . visually”) seem to refer to painting. 
De Gourmont may be right to argue that texts can treat metaphor more 
readily than painting can, but he is mistaken to think that readers of those 
metaphors are able to visually image a fusion of metaphorical terms.
 The Imagist theorists seem to be quite careful to avoid the claim of 
visual fusion, though the exact meanings of their statements are not always 
clear. In Gaudier-Brzeska, Pound (1970a: 120) takes as an example a spe-
56. This passage is from de Gourmont’s Le probleme du style (1902), a book that has not been 
translated into English.
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ci!c visual perception—“the pine tree in mist upon the far hill looks like 
a fragment of Japanese armour”—and warns the poet against “doubling 
or confusing an image” when describing it. His language is quite sensitive 
to the fallacy of visual fusion: “Still the artist, working in words only, may 
cast on the reader’s mind a more vivid image of either the armour or the 
pine by mentioning them close together or by using some device of simile 
or metaphor” (ibid.: 121). Here Pound notes that metaphor makes only one 
image—“either the armour or the pine”—more vivid; the metaphor e&ec-
tively treats just one of the terms visually instead of creating a composite 
image. Pound addresses only physical proximity on the page and seems 
careful to avoid the problematic notion of visual fusion.
 In addition, Pound’s concept of a “super-position” seems close to the 
fallacy of visual fusion but ultimately avoids direct error. In “Vorticism,” 
Pound (1970b [1914]: 89) introduces the term in connection to “Metro”: 
“the ‘one image poem’ is a form of super-position, that is to say, it is one 
idea on top of another. I found it useful in getting out of the impasse in 
which I had been left by my metro emotion.” Pound describes trimming 
down the poem to its !nal “hokku-like sentence”; though he does not state 
it explicitly, one assumes that his !nished version (“Metro”) is such a “one 
image poem” or super-position. Pound’s relation to visual imagery here is 
provocative and seemingly mistaken (in terms of the visual fusion fallacy), 
but ultimately his terminology is vague enough, in two separate ways, to 
avoid the fallacy.
 First, Pound uses the word idea—not image—in a key spot: one idea 
superimposed on another idea creates a “one image poem.” Here Pound 
skirts the dangerous implication that two images can combine to form a 
single image.57 Second, the very meaning of such a !nal “image” is in 
question. The looseness of the word image within the phrase “one image 
poem” may allow Pound to use that phrase for a poem like “Metro,” with 
its two concrete !gure-ground relationships that demand two distinct, 
though related, visual images. Here we must recall Gage’s insight that the 
Imagists spoke of the image both as a single visual image and as the intu-
ition sparked by a combination of images; as Gage (1981: 13) notes, “The 
imagists used the word image indiscriminately to refer to both the single 
descriptive phrase and the result of the combination of two such phrases.” 
That is, even if Pound’s “idea” did mean a visual image, what seems to 
be faulty math could work out, given the +exibility of the term in Imagist 
57. Certainly, the substitution of ideas for images does not explain very much. The relation 
of idea to image is confusing (Pound does not o&er an explanation), as is the relation of one 
idea to another: how is one idea placed “on top” of another? Merely physically, on the page? 
Pound does not clarify.
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usage. While Pound’s “superposition” concept is dangerously suggestive of 
visual fusion, his description of it avoids such a trap.
 Hulme’s “visual chord” analogy also edges close to the mistake of 
claiming visual fusion, but like the “super-position,” his concept ultimately 
misses that mistake. Hulme (1955a [1908]: 73) explained it thus: “Two visual 
images form what one may call a visual chord. They unite to suggest an 
image which is di&erent to both.” Certainly, Hulme’s “visual chord” implies 
a mistaken simultaneity of visual images, but it does not necessarily imply 
a mistaken fusion of visual images. After all, in a chord all pitches retain 
their distinctness while also combining together; fused images would be 
categorically uni!ed, nondistinct. If, on the other hand, Hulme had pro-
posed a “visual pigment” for the combination of two images, that analogy 
would suggest that the combination would not show the distinctive ele-
ments of the original images (many di&erent pairs of original pigments 
could form a single pigment). The chord is not a fusion in that an essential 
multiplicity remains within it. Admittedly, however, Hulme’s analogy fal-
laciously suggests that images can be seen at the same time; Hulme would 
have been better served perhaps by a “visual counterpoint” or a “visual 
trill.” The latter replacement seems quite appropriate in fact for the back-
and-forth switching between visual images that physically correspondent 
metaphorical terms often evoke.
 It is important to reiterate the relevance of ambiguous !gures for my 
notion of the visual template. The visual template allows readers to move 
between the two images but does not unify them. The reader of “Metro,” 
prompted by physical correspondence to conceive of the lines as parallel 
!gure-ground images (faces against the crowd; petals against the bough), 
organizes each image in terms of the common template, and then can switch 
back and forth between these physically similar images easily. The reader 
can visualize one image and then the other, changing faces into petals and 
petals back into faces. The analogy with the ambiguous !gures seems quite 
strong: the ambiguous !gures change as the viewer reconstrues parts and 
changes spatial perspective (minimally, as in Boring’s !gure [!gure 3], or 
globally, as in Jastrow’s duck-rabbit), and the two images mediated by the 
visual template switch back and forth as the imager articulates di&erent 
details within the shared structure, similarly reconstruing parts and chang-
ing perspective as necessary. Yet the analogy is not perfect: the images 
linked by the visual template, because articulated by the imagination, may 
be much more di&erent than the two visual images of the ambiguous !gure. 
After all, the visual images linked by the template are drawn from verbal 
cues and thus can be imagined with rich contextual cues that the reader 
images (e.g., the yellow shine on the gold rings in “Sunshine” or the foliage 
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surrounding the pond). The two visual images of the ambiguous !gure, 
however, are more limited through their original basis in perception and 
their lack of additional verbal cues attached to the metaphorical terms.
 Before we move on from the template to broader questions about the 
reader’s role in creating correspondence, we must again acknowledge that 
the structural correspondence of “Metro” or “Autumn” does not neces-
sarily produce the Necker cube–like visual switching, or even any visual 
imagery at all, for that matter. However, the structural similarities most 
likely help organize the visual response when it occurs, guiding the reader 
toward a shifting comparison of the metaphor’s two visual images.
Correspondence: On the Page or in the Mind?
At this point an objection may appear again, one anticipated in the previ-
ous discussion of Lowell’s “Sunshine” and the cognitive notion of “map-
ping.” That is, the notion of structural correspondence implies an essential 
similarity of forms between the terms of the image metaphor, a preexisting 
similarity that does not depend on the structuring activities performed by 
the reader’s mind. Such a position must acknowledge, however, the mind’s 
powerful ability to create relations and similarities from disparate things; 
that is, the possibility exists that mind may simply create the correspon-
dence rather than respond to the correspondence already existing within 
the objects. We already noted, for instance, that the reader probably makes 
the gold rings of “Sunshine” concentric circles to match up with the pond’s 
spreading waves; the poem does not specify this physical layout. Other 
poems reveal the role of the reader’s synthetic imagination even more. 
For example, the !rst stanza of Lawrence’s “Brooding Grief ” points to the 
reader’s ability to make a relation intelligible:
A YELLOW leaf from the darkness
Hops like a frog before me—
Why should I start and stand still? (Some Imagist Poets 1916: 74)
Obviously enough, a leaf does not normally hop “like a frog.” Yet the 
reader, if imaging this simile, soon visualizes a leaf, perhaps blown by 
the wind, moving with little jumps. Guided by the simile (or, to use the 
terms of conceptual metaphor, mapping the features of the frog onto the 
leaf ), the reader makes the leaf ’s motion similar to the frog’s motion. In 
other words, perhaps the reader actively creates the entire correspondence 
between the terms of metaphor rather than merely organizing a preexist-
ing correspondence.
 Yet such an acknowledgment of the mind’s creative power goes too far 
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if it suggests that all image metaphors are equally amenable to this power. 
That is, we must recognize that some image metaphors are more struc-
turally well matched than others. Both the farmer’s face and the moon in 
“Autumn,” for instance, are equally positioned (according to the speaker’s 
perspective) above the hedge. Both faces and petals in “Metro” stand out 
as small, discrete units against a jumbled background. What is key here is 
that not all image metaphors manifest clear correspondence. If “Metro” 
had been written (and here I commit aesthetic heresy for comparative pur-
poses) “The apparition of these faces in the crowd: / pencils on a wet, black 
bough,” the reader would struggle (and almost certainly fail) to visualize 
a physical match between the faces and the pencils—the !gures are very 
di&erent in shape. And still this revision, while heretical, retains the simi-
lar jumbled grounds of the crowd and bough; had I also reduced the simi-
larity of backdrop (“pencils on a still, black pond,” perhaps), the chance of 
matching the two !gure-ground relationships would sink even further.
 So: there is a middle ground between pure formalism (the text con-
tains the similar structures) and pure Constructivism (the reader creates 
all similarity), and in this middle ground a basic structural congruence 
in the metaphorical terms is developed and strengthened by the reader’s 
interpretation. Similarity both preexists and increases through the reader’s 
semantic strategies. The argument presented here holds that preexisting 
structural correspondence prompts the reader to form a visual template 
that organizes and further develops that correspondence.
Conclusion: A Wider View
The tendency for structurally correspondent image metaphors to elicit a 
shifting play of visual images certainly bears on Imagist poetry, +ush as it 
is with these metaphors, but it also bears on poems far outside Imagism’s 
purview. What else but an image metaphor, after all, do we !nd in the !rst 
four lines of John Donne’s (1990: 121) poem “The Ecstasy”? Here a cogni-
tive assessment of !gures and grounds can reveal the poem’s complexity.
Where, like a pillow upon a bed,
A pregnant bank swelled up to rest
The violet’s reclining head,
Sat we two, one another’s best.
The !rst two lines present a pillow and a swollen bank that are similarly 
plump and thus invite the reader to put them into visual alignment. The 
next two lines reveal that these two objects are merely the grounds for 
more visual images, as the poem places a “violet’s reclining head” on the 
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bank, along with the speaker and his partner. Crucially, the poem subverts 
our desire to match !gures and ground evenly: in a more symmetrical 
image metaphor (like that of “Metro,” for example), the two people would 
recline on the pillow as the violet does on the bank. This hypothetical sym-
metry would retain a categorical and visual order—natural object resting 
on a plump natural object, people resting on a plump man-made object. 
(Admittedly, the visual correspondence of the hypothetical situation would 
be greater with two +owers on the bank.) But the poem denies this poten-
tial symmetry and only leaves that possibility to our active and visually 
oriented imaginations.
 Over three hundred years later, W. H. Auden’s (1945: 197) deceptively 
simple opening stanza to “As I Walked out One Evening” likewise encour-
ages readers to visually image a strange scene:
As I walked out one evening,
Walking down Bristol Street,
The crowds upon the pavement
Were !elds of harvest wheat.
The metaphor encourages readers to see the crowds, probably dense in the 
postwork rush or full of walkers taking in the twilight air, as thickly packed 
!elds of wheat. Certainly, the metaphor suggests many nonvisual interpre-
tations—that the crowds are simultaneously dehumanized and restored to 
a more “natural” setting than the city; that the speaker feels disconnected 
from other people—but these interpretations are heightened and perhaps 
even initiated by a visual reading of the metaphorical terms. The reader 
who images the crowd and the !elds, and then mentally switches between 
them through the mediation of a visual template, is likely to experience 
the true surprise of the comparison both visually and conceptually. We see 
therefore that it is image metaphor at large, not some speci!cally Imag-
ist version of it, that solicits visual imagery; the insights of psychological 
research apply to any poetry (or even writing in general) with structurally 
correspondent image metaphors.
This cognitive and phenomenological investigation of image metaphor is 
just one piece of a larger “poetics of literary visualization.” Research by 
Gibbs and Bogdonovich suggests that the basic mechanism most readers 
use to understand image metaphor is visual imagery, not knowledge. 
Extending this visual basis, I hypothesize that most readers organize visual 
images of structurally correspondent metaphorical terms through a visual 
template, an abstract mediating !gure that allows readers to move easily 
back and forth between the two images. This template is metaphor speci!c 
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and thus less abstract than an image schema, though it is broadly similar to 
an image schema. The template depends on both the creative, organizing 
power of the reader and some basic physical agreement between image 
terms.
 The template earns some credibility through an analogy to ambigu-
ous !gures, because those !gures are more likely to be reversed during 
visual imagery if the frames of reference for each separate image generally 
match up; as Peterson et al. demonstrated, a reconstrual is an easier type 
of reversal than a reference-frame realignment. Through the visual template, 
the frames of reference for each metaphorical image are aligned—thus 
research suggests that the visual images mediated by the visual template 
may be reversed fairly easily, as I have proposed. The case of ambiguous 
!gures also reminds us that multiple images cannot be fused within visual 
imagery, a point that forces us to recognize the overreach in some critical 
claims about image metaphor and perhaps also appreciate the deftness 
of Imagist theorists in avoiding such overreach in their poetic concepts 
(“superposition,” “visual chord”).
 A poetics of literary visualization can sharpen our critical acumen: an 
understanding of the cognitive impossibility of visual fusion helps steer us 
away from arguments that try to recruit a spurious unity of visual imagery 
to support a conceptual unity, for example. But I hope that this poetics will 
be valued not just for its service to hermeneutical understandings of texts. 
I hope that a poetics of visualization will help renew interest in the visual 
imagination on its own terms too. A poetics should encourage readers 
to pay closer attention to what kind of visual images they form (if any) 
in response to what textual encouragement. Considering the ways texts 
solicit creative responses in our visual imaginations can help produce a 
fuller picture of the reading experience; this bigger picture includes a&ec-
tive responses to texts, idiosyncratic memories, imagery responses (visual 
and otherwise), and modes of attention and distraction in addition to inter-
pretive responses that create and assess meanings. A poetics of literary 
visualization may inform our interpretations of course, but it should also 
encourage us to think about the broader context of reading and the power 
of the visual imagination to enliven, reveal, and regulate the text.
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